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The problem undertaken in this thesis is to determine the Republic  
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in meeting the peculiar dilemma. The investigation then focuses on an analysis of the roles of the four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula with emphasis on the geostrategic significance of the peninsula to them and their interests in and policies toward the peninsula. In addition North and South Korea are compared, centering on their military and economic capabilities and potentialities. In the context of respective interests of those nations involved, a possible scenario for the peninsula is identified. This analysis leads to an examination of five alternatives open to South Korea.

Analysis reveals that (1) the present military balance of power on the peninsula favors the North, (2) the four great powers favor the "status quo" for the time being; in the absence of the effective deterrent on the part of South Korea, however, the scenario for the peninsula would be "North Korean Dominance of the Peninsula," and (3) the best alternative for the R.O.K. in meeting the possible future crisis is to attain an assured denial capability of its own through some viable means such as the so-called porcupine's quills, i.e. being able to inflict sufficient damage to discourage aggression.

It is therefore suggested that the R.O.K. key the direction of its self-defense to the achievement of independence in countering the surrounding superpowers as well as the communist North Korea, and for that purpose take all the preliminary steps, along with appropriate conventional measures, necessary to attain the porcupine's quills, i.e. nuclear weapons, short of actually assembling them, without violating its international commitments.

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SELF-DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN THE 1990'S

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

IL-SOON SHIN, MAJ, ROK ARMY  
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1981

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## ABSTRACT

## SELF-DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN THE 1990'S

by Major Il-Soon SHIN, ROK Army, 119 pages.

The problem undertaken in this thesis is to determine the Republic of Korea's (R.O.K.) most viable national defense strategy in the forthcoming decade in the absence or reduction of the American forces stationed in the R.O.K.

Three international political theories are introduced to provide theoretical guidelines for the R.O.K. in development of alternatives in meeting the peculiar dilemma. The investigation then focuses on an analysis of the roles of the four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula with emphasis on the geostrategic significance of the peninsula to them and their interests in and policies toward the peninsula. In addition North and South Korea are compared, centering on their military and economic capabilities and potentialities. In the context of respective interests of those nations involved, a possible scenario for the peninsula is identified. This analysis leads to an examination of five alternatives open to South Korea.

Analysis reveals that (1) the present military balance of power on the peninsula favors the North, (2) the four great powers favor the "status quo" for the time being; in the absence of the effective deterrent on the part of South Korea, however, the scenario for the peninsula would be "North Korean Dominance of the Peninsula," and (3) the best alternative for the R.O.K. in meeting the possible future crisis is to attain an assured denial capability of its own through some viable means such as the so-called porcupine's quills, i.e. being able to inflict sufficient damage to discourage aggression.

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## CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM

### INTRODUCTION

The permanent interest of sovereign states - big or small - appears to be maintenance of their independence. One of the basic lessons that small states should learn in pursuance of their interests is that international order is maintained not by law but by power. This international power politics is per se favorable to great powers, for only they, thanks to their power, can establish and maintain national relationships in a way they want, and can change their interests flexibly according to varying circumstances, while small states must owe their independence either to the balance of power, or to the preponderance of one protecting great power. Further, great powers "exercise their stabilizing function with regard to balance of power only during the zenith period of their existence."<sup>1</sup> The order of power politics thus appears to be comparatively stabilized and peaceful from the great power's standpoint; for small states, however, it is rather a disorder full of uncertainty, insecurity and even horror. A power vacuum on the doorstep of a small power is likely to be filled by some other power very quickly unless the small power fills it swiftly by taking appropriate measures. Here the question arises as to how small states should manage themselves to

survive in an environment dominated by the great powers.

#### NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) is one of those small nations struggling for independence and peace in the shadow of the big powers surrounding the peninsula. And yet, she possesses a strategic importance quite out of proportion to her size. In the strategic sense, Korea has historically served as a buffer to its neighboring states. In the current environment, however, Korea's strategic significance arises from the interaction of the four major powers with a significant interest in Korea - the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the United States. These powers seem to share a common goal in the avoidance of hostility because of the incalculable cost of another Korean war and the danger to their own foreign policy objectives. Yet, there exists an ever-present danger of military incidents that possess the potential for escalation and military conflict. This risk is incurred by the threat of overt attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) by the North Korean communists that could escalate into an actual war. R.O.K. is at present, as most other small states, in a stage that she has to conceive the means of achieving her permanent interest in rather dynamic terms because of the change of surrounding environments. Whether she is justified in so pursuing her interest depends not only on the strength of her immediate opponent,

but even more so on the relations between the great powers in whose orbit she moves.

According to Professor Hans J. Morgenthau's concept of the balance of power, R.O.K. is in a pattern of direct opposition as each of the two Koreas wants to establish its power over the other which constantly refuses to yield. Also, the R.O.K. is a part of the pattern of superpower competition;

The power of A necessary to dominate C in the face of B's opposition is balanced, if not outweighed, by B's power, while in turn, B's power to gain dominion over C is balanced, if not outweighed, by the power of A. ... The independence of C is a mere function of the power relations existing between A and B.<sup>2</sup>

A and B here, in view of the present situation of the R.O.K., C, can be considered as the R.O.K.'s allies on the one side consisting of the United States and Japan and her opponent powers in support of North Korea on the other consisting of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

In this power spectrum involving the Korean peninsula, however, there have been some significant changes during the last decade or so. The pattern of direct opposition seems to rise ever-increasingly toward the peak as North Korea has never given up its ultimate goal of communizing the entire peninsula by force. Rather, Pyongyang has embarked on a major expansion of its offensive military capability. It has tripled the number of its airborne troop carriers in a decade, has done the same with its heavy river-crossing equipment, and more than that with its tanks; it has changed its organization to facilitate the offensive campaigns, and its training has

also increased in scope and sophistication with much time devoted to mastering offensive techniques.<sup>3</sup>

The pattern of competition has been also drifting in an unfavorable direction for South Korea. This has mainly been the result of the R.O.K. perceptions of the declining image of the United States as the trustworthy vanguard of the Free World. Vietnam fell to the communists in 1975 after a long, traumatic, vain struggle resulting in great sacrifices in human and materiel resources. The destiny of Taiwan was left to float alone on the sea when its relationship with the United States was forced to be terminated by the end of 1978 in light of the U.S.-Chinese normalization of relations. As to the Korean peninsula itself, constantly announcements have been made, and actions have been taken by the United States, which point toward a lessening of her influence on the peninsula. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the Seventh U.S. Infantry Division was withdrawn by 1972. The United States stopped grant aid to the R.O.K. in 1976. Although there were many arguments and hearings with regard to President Carter's withdrawal Plan announced in May 1977, that "decision had, in fact, been made without any prior review or military analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and without consideration of the significant increase in North Korean offensive capabilities."<sup>4</sup> Although the troop withdrawal plan was eventually shelved, some 3,400 soldiers, including one battalion of the Second Infantry Division, were withdrawn by the end of 1978. General

Meyer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, further announced in early September 1980 his plan to withdraw about 900 U.S. troops from the 30,000 remaining in South Korea, in a belief that the combat readiness of units stationed in the Continental United States (CONUS) should increase.<sup>5</sup> These events highlighted the last decade, and coupled with its internal complexity involving the North Korean communists, fully enlightened the South Korean people as to the true nature of international power politics. South Korea has been fortunate thus far in deterring the enemy threat under the United States defense umbrella. Since "the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea remains the United States ultimate goal,"<sup>6</sup> however, how long the balance-of-power pendulum will continue to swing in South Korea's favor cannot be determined. South Korea often seems to be seen not only by the Koreans themselves but also by Americans as another Vietnam. South Korea is still confronted by the ever-vicious communists across the DMZ while standing on the verge of losing its great patron. Noticeably there are many close similarities between the R.O.K. of today and the Vietnam of 5 to 10 years ago, and "it is Vietnam, not Germany, that is likely to be the model for the future solution to the Korean problem."<sup>7</sup>

There are thirty-eight million people living in South Korea, in an area only about sixteen thousand square miles in size, under constant threat of enemy attack. One fourth of the entire population lives in Seoul, the heart of South Korea,

which is located only twenty-seven miles away from the enemy. The South Koreans have limited resources, and yet they are strongly determined to defend their freedom and peace. But strong determination is not the sole factor which can assure the future of the peninsula. It must be materially supported by a physical capability which is strong enough for deterrence and defense. That security is what South Korea has been pursuing ever since the Korean War Armistice was signed in 1953. The more serious problem she is faced with now is that she should prepare herself on her own without relying on outside assistance to fill any power vacuum which might occur at any time.

#### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The central purpose of this thesis will be to investigate national security alternatives open to South Korea in an attempt to determine South Korea's most viable mid-to-long range national defense strategy, considering the likelihood of eventual American military withdrawal and the ever-increasing threat from North Korea. How to meet this challenge now and in the future is of utmost importance to South Korea. It is, to a lesser degree, of importance to Japan and the United States. But it is in reality South Korea's life-or-death problem.



## ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

The investigation begins with a review of some international political theories that are related to the issue. In this review, I will attempt to present some of the basic principles governing international power politics and guidelines for small states in the international arena. In addition, I will briefly evaluate their applicabilities to the Korean environment. In the subsequent chapter, I will analyze, using the situational analysis approach, the interactions of external powers focusing on their interests in and policies toward South Korea, as well as the game-players themselves on the Korean peninsula. In chapter IV, I will examine major alternatives open to South Korea, possible courses of action, in countering the most likely scenario, in order to determine the most viable and assured alternative for the self-defense of the Republic of Korea in the mid-to-long range.

## CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

1. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, 3rd ed., p.50.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed., pp. 174-175.
3. John H. Cushman (LTG, Ret), "The Military Balance in Korea," Asian Affairs, VI(July/August 1979), p.367.
4. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troop from Korea, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, p.2. Hereafter cited as Hearings, I.I.R., 1979.
5. John K. Cooley, "Will US Army reforms whip forces into fighting trim?" The Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1980, p.5.
6. Hearings, I.I.R., 1979, p.8.
7. Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, p.37.

## CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

### OVERVIEW

Among many international political theories the review has been confined to those benchmark theories in the interest of focus. In fact there are not many valid theories applicable to a peculiar situation like the one on the Korean peninsula. A theoretical concept is assumed to be valid only if its generalizations remain constant when subjected to the tests of time and changing environment. In this regard, the following theories are considered to represent benchmarks in conceptual validity of the South Korean self-defense alternatives in that they envision the direction for the R.O.K. to follow in today's fluid international arena:

1. Convergence Theory, developed by the modern political thinkers to describe the relationship between capitalism and communism.

2. Machiavellian Theory, developed for the prince of a small state in sixteenth century Italy.

3. Porcupine Theory, recently developed with special<sup>1</sup> attention to the South Korean situation.

### CONVERGENCE THEORY

One of the most intriguing of the speculations still prevalent in the Western world is that given the workings of

the scientific-technological revolution and industrialization process generally, the societies of the two different kinds in terms of ideology, social structure and so forth are destined to move closer and closer together until they finally converge at some in-between point, neither one nor the other but a hybrid of the two. Although this theory emerged in the West to envision the relationship between capitalism and socialism in theoretical terms, it is in general applicable to any situation in which two different ideological concepts are opposing to each other. The theory predicts the convergence and ultimate commonality of the capitalist and socialist system on the ground that modern industrial practices require and dictate the emergence of common cultures and values and similar forms of political, economic and social organization.<sup>2</sup> Convergence is supposed to begin with modern large-scale production with heavy requirements of capital, sophisticated technology and, as a prime consequence, elaborate organization. According to John K. Galbraith who explains this theory relating to the industrial system, ideology is not the relevant force because large and complex organizations can use diverse knowledge and talent and thus function effectively only if under their own authority.<sup>3</sup> He says that what determines the shape of economic society is the imperatives of technology and organization, not the image of ideology.<sup>4</sup> Ideology is considered as the irrelevant force. Instead, the role of technology here is seen to be very important since it not only

causes change but is a response to change; though it requires extensive organization, it is also the result of organization. Through a series of analyses Galbraith concludes that there is a broad convergence between industrial systems mainly due to the effect of these technological interactions.

Although few in the West appeared willing to accept such an outlook, many clung to the hope that it still would be possible to bring the socialist camp to a point of reconstitution of its system with that of the capitalist West. And this theory was seen as implying not only the desirability and ultimate inevitability of an entente between capitalism and communism but the futility of East-West competition as a whole. Despite some theoretical arguments as to the validity of the theory the two extreme states with ostensibly different industrial systems will end up, according to the theory, at essentially the same place, that is, with the disappearance of basic differences between them and the convergence of the two at, in the words of John K. Galbraith, "all fundamental points?"<sup>5</sup>

Thus the Convergence Theory should be theoretically applicable to the Korean peninsula as it is divided and occupied by the two extreme states. In fact South Korea has been constantly launching a reconciliation campaign during the past three decades, coincidentally with the guidance of this theory in an attempt to ease tensions on the peninsula. South Korea, for example, has been proposing contacts between the two sides in trade, academic, sports, and artistic exchanges

as the first step toward the realization of this theory. There seems to be a hope for this campaign when one listens to Malcolm W. Browne who said, "Despite the vast differences between Western oriented South Korea and Communist North Korea, some curious similarities seem to have survived their isolation from each other during the last quarter century." <sup>6</sup> In the long run North Korea might have to respond to the South Korean initiatives in light of the possibility that South Korea could achieve military and economic preponderance on the peninsula as a whole. Hopefully, as one Korean policy-maker put it, "North Korea will have no choice but to respond." <sup>7</sup> As of the present, however, there is no sign and very little likelihood that this theory can be proved to be realistic, as the inhabitants of the two existing states are not willing to abandon their own way of life and submit to the way of life preferred by the inhabitants of the other state. The North Korean leadership still proclaims that communists will never give up their ideas and principles in their struggle for world-wide triumph. Through the past three decades, there have emerged a number of fundamental differences in the two Koreas which can hardly be overcome. Even the speech habits have changed. While North Korea constantly rejects all those proposals, how can even a basis for rebuilding mutual trust be created? Many South Koreans now concede that it is most unlikely that the North Korean communists will ever deliberately move from a socialist system to a capitalist system. Neither do they foresee Western

capitalism now prevailing in South Korea simply falling prey to communism. Galbraith might have oversimplified the images of ideology.

#### MACHIAVELLI'S "THE PRINCE"

Counselling the prince of a small state in sixteenth century Italy, Machiavelli wrote that since conflict according to law, the method of men, was not always sufficient, the ruler sometimes needed recourse to the methods of the beasts. Thus the prince "must imitate the fox and the lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. Those that wish to be only lions do not understand this." <sup>8</sup> This counsel still seems valid for those nations with little armed might.

Machiavelli defines the purpose of government as the establishment and the maintenance of ordered rule by a prince. To accomplish this requires authority, and Machiavelli argued that the source of authority was always in some sort of power. He further thought that in a time of chaos and freebooting the first necessities of power were that it should be absolute and secure. Thus he conceived that the first and the last thing in politics was the gaining, holding and exercise of power, the power of a prince. While a prince may be involved in many types of power, "a wise prince must rely on what is in his power and not on what is in the power of others." <sup>9</sup> A prince must lay solid foundations, since otherwise he will

inevitably destroyed. The main foundations of all states are good laws and good arms (emphasis mine). He placed a particular emphasis on 'good arms' by saying that one cannot have good laws without good arms, and where one has good arms, he is likely to have good laws as well.<sup>10</sup> Machiavelli further escalated the importance of good arms by relating it to the dangers a prince may be exposed to, from within in respect of his subjects, and from without in respect of foreign powers. While a prince may be able to defend himself against the former with good laws, against the latter he must defend himself with good arms and good allies, and "if he have good arms he will always have good allies."<sup>11</sup> A prince, therefore, should never be negligent in raising and maintaining 'good arms' of his own. Machiavelli says that a prince should have no care or thought but for war, if he intends to preserve his principedom.

Thus the main substance of power is, in Machiavelli's term, good arms. And to be good, it must be what is in the ruler's own power. To support his statement concerning the necessity for a prince to have good arms of his own, Machiavelli provides examples of 'mercenary arms' and 'auxiliaries,' which are described as unprofitable arms. He says that those mercenary arms and auxiliaries may be useful soldiers for themselves, but are always hurtful to him who employs them; for "if they are defeated, he (the employer) is undone, if victorious, he becomes their prisoner."<sup>12</sup> Machiavelli further



introduces the David-Goliath story from the Old Testament to prove the impotence and incredibility of outside forces. When little David offered himself to go forth and fight Goliath, the Philistine champion, he was encouraged by Saul to be armed with Saul's own armor, but David rejected that idea saying that "with these untried arms I cannot prevail,"<sup>13</sup> and rather he chose to meet his enemy with his own sling. David's sling might not have been 'good arms' but certainly was in David's own power and he could rely on it. David rejected Saul's proposal because he surely did not want to become his prisoner in case he was victorious. In brief, "good allies" has a meaning to a prince only when he has "good arms"; otherwise, he would become allies' prisoner even with the victory.

By strongly emphasizing the importance of "good arms of one's own" in respect of the dangers from outside, Machiavelli provides a still valid and invaluable lesson for those small states, including the R.O.K., that are lacking in the military power strong enough to carry out a policy by force against their direct opponent and/or strong and big state(s) for any protracted period.

#### PORCUPINE THEORY

The Porcupine Theory, set forth by Professor Lee Sang-Woo of Seogang University, Korea, is a theory applicable to a small state that strives toward achieving a self-defense capability in an international political order dominated by

strong powers. The core of the theory is very simple: a small state is secure and safe as long as it possesses a deterrence capability which can inflict on any concerned strong power a comparatively large damage in contrast to any possible gain that that strong power might obtain through exercise of its influential power.<sup>14</sup> It comes from the structural significance of a porcupine itself. That is, a porcupine is not likely to be attacked by such strong animals as lions or tigers because, although it is no match for them in terms of strength, it is armed with quills capable of delivering decisive damage.

The Theory is composed of following propositions:

Proposition 1 : Every nation acts in a direction of promoting its own interest.

Proposition 2 : Power is exercised in accordance with utilitarian calculations.

Proposition 3 : It is possible for a small state to achieve a capability to inflict damage greater than the gain expected by the attacking strong power.

Proposition 4 : A strong power will restrain itself from attacking a small state when the loss is estimated to be greater than the gain; consequently a small state comes to acquire deterrence capability.<sup>15</sup>

The Porcupine Theory centered on the universality of Proposition 4 above is assumed to be acceptable as an available theory

for small states, provided that the first three propositions can be determined valid in light of the reality of the situation, and their logical linkage can be shown. In this regard<sup>16</sup> Professor Lee Sang-Woo explains as follows :

Proposition 1 is not easy to prove, for "operationalization" of the concept of interest is not only difficult per se but also difficult to measure as a consequence. However, it is common sense for any nation to pursue its own interest for its own sake, although the nature of benefits from a certain course of action may be different due to the different standards of determining them. Thus this proposition can be easily accepted without raising too much opposition.

Proposition 2 recognizes the capability of a nation to reflect in actual behavior its general attribute of pursuing its interests. In other words, modern nations are assumed to be smart enough to conduct efficiently cost-benefit analysis in pursuing their interests, and they exercise power accordingly when benefits are determined to be worth the risk of doing so. The proposition also enables one to estimate the future behavioral spectrum of a particular nation by recognizing the selectivity in exercise of its military capability.

The issue in Proposition 3 is not to discuss how much power a nation has but concerns the possibility for a small state to be able to inflict significant damage on a big power. While it is still possible to accept this proposition when viewed in terms of conventional weapons as proved in Vietnam,

the technological development of modern warfare certainly enables us to envision even greater validity of this proposition. Continuous development is being made at rapid rate in the fields of precision-guided and LASER-assisted weapon systems which have great destructive power. Besides, the best and most important example would be nuclear weapons. Since it is a mass destruction weapon, a nuclear weapon can inflict incalculable damage even with a single warhead. When a small state is armed, even to a limited degree, with a nuclear retaliation capability against the attacker, it becomes in fact equal to the attacker regardless of its relative size. And this nuclear deterrence effect can never be overlooked by the attacker regardless of its size. Thus these technological developments increase the small state's capability to inflict damage on big powers. In this regard it is envisioned that the chances for Proposition 3 to become valid certainly are increasing.

Proposition 4 is then expected to be a logical outcome once the first three propositions are proved to be valid. This is not to say that it has to be so, logically speaking, but rather that its probability is gradually becoming greater.

The gist of this theory is that a small state can, through improvement of its retaliation capability, deter an attack by a big power. The possibility for a small state to acquire porcupine's quills is ever increasing due to the development of weapons technology.

The agony of the R.O.K. arises from the very fact that it is surrounded by the four superpowers of the world. Although the national power, especially the conventional military power, of the R.O.K. is not weak per se, the R.O.K. cannot but remain in the status of small power because military capabilities of the surrounding big powers are relatively too strong. This situation is likely to prevail during the upcoming decades. In this regard, the Porcupine Theory seems particularly applicable to the R.O.K. which is faced with the foremost task of achieving self-sufficiency in national defense, in a sense that it is strictly a deterrence-defense strategy for a small state surrounded and/or dominated by big powers.<sup>17</sup>

#### SUMMARY

In reviewing the literature central to the peculiar environment of the Korean peninsula, it is apparent that those lessons deduced from the chosen theories are immeasurably valuable to the R.O.K. and therefore should be taken into consideration in formulating its future national defense strategy. Although South Korean attempts to apply the Convergence Theory to its relations with the North Korean communists have thus far failed to bear any fruit, her continued effort will hopefully result in a situation such that "North Korea will have no choice but to respond." At the same time the R.O.K. must bear in mind those lessons, as described in Machiavelli's Theory and the Porcupine Theory, concerning the "good arms of

one's own," and the significance of "the porcupine's quills," since it is not only in direct confrontation with North Korea but also a part of the pattern of superpower competition. While the Convergence Theory is related to the internal complexity between the South and North Korea on the peninsula itself, the Machiavellian and Porcupine Theories provide South Korea with valuable guidelines for her stance primarily with regard to the surrounding superpowers. Thus any future alternative for the South Korean self-defense must be in conformity with those theoretical concepts.

## CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

1. This Porcupine Theory was originated, to the best of my knowledge, in 1976 by Professor Lee Sang-Woo at Seogang University, Korea.
2. Leon Goure, Convergence of Communism and Capitalism, p.62.
3. John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, p.390.
4. Ibid., p.7.
5. Ibid., p.391.
6. Malcolm W. Browne, "2 Koreas, Despite Isolation, Retain Cultural Similarities," The New York Times, July 1, 1979, p.12. \*Mr. Browne is one of the eight Western correspondents who accompanied Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations on his trip to Seoul and Pyongyang in early May 1979.
7. Kyong Won Kim, "Keeping the Korean Peace," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 19, 1976, p.34.
8. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Hill Thompson (1954), p.128.
9. Ibid., p.16.
10. Ibid., p.94.
11. Ibid., p.133.
12. Ibid., p.103.
13. Ibid., p.106.
14. Sang- Woo Lee, "Defense Capability of a Small State and the Porcupine Theory," Selection of International Political Essays, XVI(April 1977), p.135.
15. Ibid. : This is a direct interpretation of the original Korean version, done to the best of my knowledge.
16. Ibid., pp.135-137. Line 6 on page 17 through line 21 on page 18 are author's summary of Professor Lee's explanation.
17. Ibid., p.138.

### CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS OF SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

#### GENERAL: GEOGRAPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Located at the east end of Asia and in the northern periphery of the Pacific, the Korean peninsula, as a strategic nexus of Northeast Asia, has served in the past century as both a bridge and an arena of competition and conflict between the U.S.S.R., China, Japan, and the U.S. in respect to the systematic structure and function of an order for Northeast Asia. Because of its geographical location in the proximity of its powerful neighbors, Korea has existed as an autonomous state for most of its long history since the first century B.C. by virtue of the control or intervention of those neighbors. Thus the very existence of Korea as an autonomous state has been for more than two thousand years a function of the balance of power in the Far East, either in terms of the supremacy of one power that protected Korea or in terms of rival imperialisms meeting on the Korean peninsula and establishing there a very unstable equilibrium. The controlling and protecting power was traditionally China, challenged from time to time with varying success by Japan. Around the end of the sixteenth century, Japan invaded Korea without lasting success, but later successfully challenged China for its own claim to control the peninsula. Japan was able to make good that claim as a result of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Then Japan



whose influence became dominant on the peninsula from 1896 on was, in turn, challenged in its control of Korea by Russia. The rivalry between Japan and Russia for control of Korea ended with the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japanese control of Korea, thus firmly established, ended with the defeat of Japan in the Second World War. Then the United States and the Soviet Union took over the historic function with regard to Korea, the United States in effect taking the place of Japan and the Soviet Union that of China. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could allow the other power to control all of Korea. As seen from the vantage point of Japan, whose protection is a vital interest of the United States, Korea in the hands of potentially hostile power is like a drawn dagger; it is seen the same way from the vantage point of Russia and more particularly China. Thus the division of Korea into an American and Russian zone at the end of the Second World War was the expression both of the two Koreas and of the powers available to them, since at that time neither great power was in a position to risk a major conflict over the control of Korea. The issue of the control of all of Korea was reopened in 1950 when North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union and China, attacked South Korea. The all-out support of the United States for South Korea was justified by its interest in the security of Japan and the over-all stability of the Far East.

At present the Korean peninsula occupies the center of

a triangle with the sides formed by Japan, China and the Soviet Union. As the center point, the Korean peninsula suffers vulnerability from all directions. Nevertheless, as the center point, the peninsula occupies a strategic location with respect to each side. Each nation in the triangle has attempted over the past century to occupy this center point as either a defensive measure against the other two, an offensive measure to project its power against the other two, or a combination of both strategies. Since the Korean War, the United States has represented the third side as a surrogate Japan, although not representing total Japanese national interests on the peninsula. While North Korea is taking advantage of its own triangular relationship as it maintains close ties with both Russia and China between which an endless dispute is prevailing, South Korea has been and still is solely dependent on the United States. In other words South Korea has only one side to lose of the power politics triangle. It is also important to realize the geographical significance of South Korea's location immediately adjacent to its enemy, close to its enemy's allies, and far from its own ally, the United States. Thus the maintenance of stability on this peninsula relies on two related sets of objective conditions: the strategic military balance between the surrounding big powers, and the regional military balance between South and North Korea on the peninsula itself. Any significant change on either side of the triangle or on the pattern of direct opposition certainly will alter the balance of

power on the peninsula. The enemy, a large and powerful force, watching across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) grants no time-outs. Surrounded on the one side by such an implacable and powerful communist adversary and on the other three sides by water, South Korea does not have any maneuver space to trade.

#### ROLES OF FOREIGN POWERS

##### U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union's interest in Korea has been intense only in the last century. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 prevented domination of the peninsula by Czarist Russia. Since then the U.S.S.R. experienced the Siberian expedition in 1918-1923 with Korea as the gateway, and observed Japan extend control over resource-rich Manchuria in 1931. During most of World War II, the Soviet Union honored its non-aggression pact with Japan, but advantageously entered the war just prior to the end and quickly seized the northern half of the Korean peninsula under an agreement with the U.S.

Postwar activities by the Soviet Union indicate the high strategic value given to the peninsula. First, under Soviet tutelage, North Korea emerged as a state and Kim Il-sung rose to power and leadership. Beginning with the Soviet diplomatic moves during the Allied Occupation of Korea until the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S.S.R. aided and abetted North Korean development as a Soviet satellite, and Kim's decision to invade South Korea was made with the full approval of Stalin.

The Korean War shattered the Soviet hold on Kim Il-sung, who began to assert the self-identity of his regime. Yet, Soviet aid partially financed North Korea's rebuilding program. Until Pyongyang's break with Moscow in 1962, Soviet aid totaled an estimated \$ 692 million.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet presence and influence in North Korea fell to its postwar nadir from 1962-1964. The reasons for this decline were varied. First, South Korea's new anti-communist military government appeared menacing, and Kim's imperialistic attitude faced a Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and detente with the West. The memory of the Korean War and Moscow's failure to come aggressively to North Korea's aid was not lost on Kim Il-sung. Second, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and anti-personality cult disturbed Kim Il-sung, whose power foundation was built along Stalin's methods.

In 1965, after a visit from Premier Alexksei N. Kosygin, Russo-North Korean relations were reconciled, although Kim Il-sung moved to balance his Sino-Soviet relations and reassert North Korean autonomy in foreign affairs. Soviet military and economic aid were renewed; a vital factor if<sup>2</sup> North Korea hoped to maintain parity with South Korea.

Present relations between the two countries remain normalized, but the relationship appears as one of mutual convenience, not one of so great cordiality or comradeship as just before the outbreak of the Korean War. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union supports Kim Il-sung's effort to communize South Korea, and it is committed to automatic and immediate defense

of North Korea in the event of external aggression.<sup>3</sup>

The present validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) indicates that the Soviet Union gives high strategic value to the peninsula on the following bases.

First, the peninsula provides the Soviet Union with an outstanding military base and maritime advance route in view of its ocean-based grand strategy. The Soviet Union's hope to obtain a naval base(s) with favorable conditions reflects its intention to expand its power of influence over the Pacific and the Indian Ocean area. The Soviet Union has about one-third of its total forces stationed in the Far East, and its naval bases in this region are limited to Petropavlovsk, Sovetskaya Gavan and Vladivostok.<sup>4</sup> Although these bases have excellent port facilities, they are normally frozen for three to four months starting in December. Especially Vladivostok, the base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, is characterized by heavy fog for about three months every year. Furthermore another great weakness of this naval base is that it is being over-watched by the opponents, mainly Japan and the United States, as all the routes to and from this base are very close to Japan. There are four routes through which the Soviet Pacific Fleet can advance into the Pacific: Tatar Strait between the Maritime Provinces and Sakhalin, Soya Strait between Sakhalin and Hokkaido, Tsugara Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu,

and Korea Strait between the Korean peninsula and Japan. Among these four the Tatar Strait becomes frozen in winter time and is considered to be uneconomical due to the excessively extended lane requiring large turn-around movement. Soya Strait and Tsugara Strait are under the constant surveillance by the United States and Japanese navies. As the gateway to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, the Korea Strait provides the shortest route for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which, by taking advantage of the narrowness of the strait, can avoid close surveillance by the United States, Japanese and South Korean navies. Thus the best exit for the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the Korea Strait. Statistics show that approximately 50 percent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet ships passing through those four straits since 1975 go via the Korea Strait, thus proving its value.<sup>5</sup> Thus the stability of the Korean peninsula is directly related to maintaining Russian Far Eastern territory. The Korean peninsula is therefore considered to be strategically valuable to the Soviet Union which has deployed the majority of its naval forces in the Far East with which to control its regional territory.

Second, the peninsula is evaluated as an important Russian base of operation to contain a possible United States-Japan-P.R.C. alliance. With the peninsula on its side, the Soviet Union easily can isolate and threaten Japan by achieving naval supremacy over the Sea of Japan and having control of the Korea Strait. It can also deny any United States advance into

the Far East region by containing the United States Pacific power. As to Sino-Soviet relations, the strategic importance of the peninsula has been increased since the 1960's during which the Sino-Soviet dispute developed. When and if the Soviet Union becomes predominant over the P.R.C. on the peninsula, it can threaten from the Korean peninsula as well as through Manchuria, thus forcing the P.R.C. to fight on three fronts. The Soviet Union will also achieve a decisive advantage in that case by attaining naval supremacy over the Yellow Sea, which will, in turn, enable her to threaten seriously the Chinese Northern Ocean Fleet and to block the Chinese coast when deemed necessary. Naval supremacy over the Sea of Japan will also preclude the United States and Japan from intervening in the Sino-Soviet dispute and prevent the P.R.C. from advancing into the Maritime Provinces which are supposed to be the most vulnerable area in the Far East to the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup>

Third, the Korean peninsula can facilitate development of natural resources in Siberia, where about 80 % of Russian resources are deposited.<sup>7</sup> Development of natural resources is nowadays a great concern of every nation, and for that reason the Soviet's expectation toward Siberian development is indeed great. Strengthening the Pacific Fleet and expanding military activities throughout the region is also inter-related to this issue. Thus the significance of the Korean peninsula lies in the fact that its control by the

Soviet Union will greatly enhance her diplomatic stance in the Far Eastern region vis-a-vis the United States, Japan and the P.R.C. respectively and collectively.

The Soviet Union's policy toward the Korean peninsula has been expressed historically as a link in the chain of its southward expansion policy. In reality the Soviet Union's support for Kim Il-sung's effort to communize South Korea is mainly based on its keen interest in South Korea's warm water ports which would be advantageous to its growing naval activities. <sup>8</sup> Attaining a firm access to ice-free and warm water ports has been one of the permanent interests of Russian foreign policy. The Russians have been persistently seeking access to naval berthing facilities, petroleum storage areas and airfields which would greatly enhance their military capabilities in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. The Korean peninsula meets all these requirements. It is an ideal base point for advancement into the Pacific and an ideal base to form an encirclement network against the P.R.C.

From the security standpoint the U.S.S.R. has an interest in preventing an unfriendly major power from gaining predominant influence in neighboring Korea. For this the Soviet Union is attempting to deal with South and North Korea on an individual basis and make each of the two Koreas into pro-Soviet states. <sup>9</sup> Especially the Soviet Union is trying to entice Pyongyang away from Peking and make it one of its loyal satellites. After the end of World War II the U.S.S.R. was North



Korea's chief supplier of economic and military aid. With the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, the P.R.C. became an overt rival influence in Pyongyang and an important provider of aid. Rivalry between the two communist powers, in fact, has made it possible for North Korea to play one off against the other and thus gain considerable freedom of action. Despite somewhat cool Soviet-North Korean relations, the Soviet Union is likely to maintain its status quo policy. An open break is unlikely as Moscow fears driving Pyongyang into the arms of Peking, while North Korea is still heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for technology, sophisticated weapons, and oil. The current attitude of the Soviet Union toward Korea is governed less by concern for its bilateral relations with North Korea than by its policies toward the other three big powers with interests in Korea; the U.S., Japan, and China. To avoid losing influence relative to China, it will respond somewhat to North Korean pressure, but not to the point of seriously interfering with its more important objectives of maintaining detente with the U.S. and improving relations with Japan. Its relations with Korea are not a high-priority issue for Moscow at least for the time being. However, if Soviet security were to be threatened by a U.S.-P.R.C.-Japan alliance, it would not hesitate to consider the option of destroying the status quo by launching a proxy war through North Korea. Nevertheless, Moscow, in the future, is likely to avoid the extreme of encouraging military action against the South and publicly

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advocating a two-Koreas policy. In fact, Moscow has been cautious to some extent in dealing with North Korea due to the strain in Soviet-North Korean relations derived from the Sino-North Korean-Soviet triangular concept. Some variables which will affect Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula in the future are Moscow's conflict with China, U.S. determination to defend South Korea, and a change in North Korean leadership.

P.R.C.

Chinese interest in Korea goes back to ancient times when China possessed suzerainty over Korea. Chinese influence over Korea's foreign affairs, except for Hideyoshi's destructive invasions in the 1590's, remained free of Japanese interference until 1876. Then, within two decades, China was forced out of the peninsula by Japan. The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 denied China its former traditional role. Over the next fifty years China observed the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula as it provided the entrance-way for Japan's imperialistic designs on Manchuria and China.

As World War II ended, Communist and Nationalist forces in China rekindled their long-standing civil war. Preoccupation with the consolidation of power by the victorious Communist forces after October, 1949 did not deter Chinese intervention during the Korean War in time to rescue Kim Il-sung's communist state from collapse. With the North Korean Army virtually annihilated, and the United Nations Command (UNC), consisting

primarily of U.S. forces, pressing toward the Yalu River, the P.R.C. rushed a so-called volunteer army into the peninsula and bore the brunt of fighting almost three years.

After the War, Peking granted Kim's government \$ 200 million, waived all expenses of the Korean War, and promised to train North Korean technicians. Since China had launched its own first Five-Year Plan in 1953 which required all available resources, this aid indicated that Peking must have regarded the rehabilitation of North Korea as a matter of great importance.<sup>11</sup>

Beginning in 1956 Chinese influence with Kim Il-sung began to suffer from the Sino-Soviet split. Kim attempted to escape the dilemma of the schism by following the path of non-alignment. After the May 16th coup in Seoul, Kim hurried to Peking and Moscow in July, 1961, to conclude identical mutual defense treaties with both powers. Nevertheless, by 1962 North Korea was unmistakably in the Chinese camp. Peking's monopoly on influence and prestige in North Korea lasted until 1965, when rapprochement between Kim and Premier Khrushchev's successors took place. In 1967 Peking responded to the improved Russo-North Korean relations by spreading false rumors that the North Korean Army toppled Kim in a military coup. Kim vehemently denied these reports and charged China with "big-<sup>12</sup> power chauvinism."

During the 1970's North Korea and the P.R.C. again moved closer together. First, China denounced the American

EC-121 reconnaissance plane shot down by North Korea in April, 1969 as U.S. "aggression." Second, the two countries concluded the Yalu and Tuman Rivers Navigation Coordination Committee Agreement and North Korea appointed an ambassador to Albania, China's closest ally, as a gesture of friendship. Third, Premier Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April, 1970, and the two nations reaffirmed their intentions to jointly resist any U.S.-<sup>13</sup> Japan aggression on the peninsula. Finally, when Kim visited Peking on 28 April, 1975, China for the first time publicly recognized North Korea as "the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation." Presently, a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the P.R.C. and the D.P.R K. prevails.

As far as the geographical significance is concerned, Korea is, if anything, even more strategically important to China than to the Soviet Union. Historically China has defined, literally, its relationship with Korea as the "lips-and-teeth<sup>14</sup> relations." This does not imply a mutually supporting relationship on an equal basis but a subordinate relationship such that events in Korea have had a great impact on the fate of China. "Lips" are viewed by China as a sort of natural mouth-piece or house-fence because they provide the "teeth," China itself, with initial protection from cold wind, any unexpected instantaneous incident, and so forth. As the Chinese lips, the Korean peninsula, first of all, plays the role as a buffer state containing the advance of surrounding oceanic

powers.

Located in the middle, the peninsula has been buffeted historically by many direct confrontations among the Japanese, the Americans and the continental Chinese powers. When the peninsula instead tilted toward one particular outside country, the balance of power in the region broke down and it served as a stepping-stone to expansionism.

Secondly, in tactical terms, the Korean peninsula is the Covering Force Area (CFA), while mainland China and especially Manchuria are the Main Battle Area (MBA). Chinese industries are concentrated in Manchuria from which more than 50 % of Chinese crude oil is produced. While the four modernizations dictate Chinese domestic and foreign policies today, protection of those natural resources is considered to be highly important in terms of national strategy. In this regard the Korean peninsula is indeed the CFA not only for the Manchuria but also for the mainland China as it helps to protect the MBA against cold wind.

Thirdly, located adjacent to both China and Russia, the peninsula plays the role as a balancer-of-power in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In reality, military value of the peninsula to China is increasing in view of this Sino-Soviet conflict. If and when China can exercise influencing power on the peninsula, it can impose a serious threat on the logistic bases in the rear area of the Soviet Far East Forces by attacking the Maritime Provinces. It can protect itself from oceanic

threat against important coastal areas by securing zones around the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. By blocking the Cheju Strait it can also interdict the Russian sea lanes. Furthermore, China can impose a direct threat to the Soviet Far East Fleet by deploying naval forces into the Sea of Japan, utilizing the peninsula as an intermediate base. Thus the condition of "lips" certainly poses a great impact on the fate of "teeth," especially so in cold and rainy weather.

Chinese traditional interests in Korea have not abated. But at least five reasons have prevented active resumption of its former role: (1) Japanese preeminence in Korea from 1895-1945; (2) U.S. preeminence in South Korea from 1950 to the present; (3) domestic instability in China; (4) competition from the U.S.S.R. to influence North Korea and the Sino-Soviet split; and (5) most important, Kim Il-sung's ultra-nationalistic and independent attitude in foreign affairs.

In its struggle against encirclement by hostile powers, the P.R.C. has looked to North Korea as an ally and has launched a massive propaganda campaign to display their solidarity. China needs North Korea as an ally in pursuing its strategy of confronting the U.S.S.R., but it lacks Moscow's capability to meet North Korea's economic and military needs. Peking's policy toward the Korean problem must be viewed in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Peking has consistently supported North Korea's official position on the Korean question and has endorsed North

Korea's policy of "one Korea" in the United Nations, rejecting the "German formula." Peking couples the Taiwan problem in its statements, though it is aware of the differences in the two situations. The P.R.C. and North Korea have divergent perspectives on the Korean questions, as reflected in their different expectations of participants in any new peace negotiations and other issues.

Peking's normalization of relations with the U.S. plays a critical role in Peking's policy toward Korea. Despite the purge of Chiang Ching and her followers, who were the strongest supporters of Kim's position, there is presently no significant indication that Peking's policy will change. Peking rejected the proposal for a four-power conference; it supports Kim's call for a Koryo Confederation; it also supports a ban on delivery of conventional weapons to both Koreas, and advocates total elimination of nuclear weapons. It has recognized the D.P.R.K. as the only legitimate Korean state and has shown no sign of wanting to move toward cross-recognition.

While the P.R.C. supports the "one Korea" principle, it does not endorse military confrontation because: (1) China views unification as a long-term problem, rather than a priority; (2) military action would jeopardize Sino-American normalization of relations and its own four modernization programs; (3) Japan might be led to re-armament; (4) North Korea's dependence on the U.S.S.R. would increase. China knows that Russia has a far more powerful military establishment. Although Russia might not be able to conquer China, it would wreak

enormous destruction and wipe out the gains that have been made through Chinese blood and sweat over a period of three decades. No sane Chinese leadership would want such an outcome, particularly a leadership whose highest priority has now turned to economic development and modernization.

Like the U.S.S.R. China, therefore, gives priority to its relations with the U.S., and Japan over its relations with North Korea. China's rapprochement with the U.S., which clearly came as a shock to North Korea, and its subsequent normalization of relations with Japan made the Chinese less vigorous in their support of North Korea. They have toned down their attacks on U.S. policy toward the R.O.K. With regard to the President Carter's announcement of his withdrawal plan in May, 1977, for example, Peking doubtlessly anticipated with some anxiety that in the wake of a U.S. military pullout from South Korea will come a rise in the relative power of the Soviet Union in a region crucial to China's security.<sup>15</sup> There are also indications that the P.R.C., at least in the short run, views the U.S. presence as a necessary balancing element in the area.<sup>16</sup> China would certainly not be interested in increasing the risk of conflict that would gravely undermine its efforts to strengthen its position relative to the Soviet Union by cultivating its relations with the U.S. and Japan. Also, conflict in Korea would increase the risk of rearmament of Japan, an outcome that China could hardly view with favor. For China, as for the Soviet Union, it is thus not a high-priority



issue.

While China probably would not want to become involved militarily on the Korean peninsula again, the Sino-Soviet split accentuates an unstable security situation on China's northern border. As long as Sino-Soviet rapprochement is out of question, as pointed out by Deng Xio-ping on September 25, 1977, China must consider control of its North Korean border state by a friendly power even more important for the next generation.<sup>17</sup> It will therefore continue to exert much effort in containing the Russian threat according to its anti-hegemony policy by supporting the military treaty with North Korea and its unification policy.

#### JAPAN

Japanese interests on the Korean peninsula in the past century are divided into pre-1945 and post-1945 involvement. In the pre-1945 era, Japan waged two wars against China and Russia for control of the peninsula, annexed and attempted to assimilate Korea into the Japanese Empire, and used the peninsula as one gateway for expansion into Manchuria and China. Japan in this era exercised almost absolute political, military, and economic control of Korea. Strategically, Japan placed high value on Korea, initially as a defense line against foreign encroachments on Japan, and later as a jumping off point for offensive operations against China.

Japanese interests of the post-1945 era are practically

the antithesis of the previous period. Five reasons account for this change: (1) the political division of the peninsula into the R.O.K. and D.P.R.K.; (2) Japan's more democratic and pluralistic government; (4) constitutional repudiation of war; and (5) the U.S. policy of protecting South Korea from external aggression.

Strategic values of the Korean peninsula can be summarized as follows. First, the peninsula is of importance to Japan in its role as bridging the gap between the islands of Japan and mainland of Asia. Up until the Far East became civilized the only adjacent country known to Japan was Korea, from which Japan imported its cultural heritage. Japan, situated in a passive position "from the continent" until the Meiji Restoration, was transformed into an active position afterwards "to the continent."<sup>18</sup> As a consequence the Korean peninsula was used as a jumping off point for expansion into the continent of Asia. Second, in defense terms, the Korean peninsula blocks expansion of the continental powers and plays the role as a buffer zone for the furtherance of Japanese security. The Japanese view toward the peninsula at present is closely related to their expectation that the peninsula must be able to protect Japan from the threat of continental powers. Japan, thus far, has been privileged not to worry much about the defense of its territory thanks to the secured condition on the Korean peninsula. Also, the peninsula is important to Japan in terms of Japanese continued effort of searching for

economic markets. Ever since the Second World War Japan has been pursuing an industrialization policy. In this regard the R.O.K. has been functioning as one of its major product exchange markets, as a capital market, and as a part of the Japanese industrial chain. Although Japan has recently explored the potential big market of mainland China, the R.O.K. will continue to be important to Japan as it facilitates Japanese economy through their investment into South Korea, and various economic operations such as Joint Development of the Continental Shelf.

The primary concern of the Japanese in respect of the Korean peninsula is to prevent renewed conflict there so that it can continue to pursue its economy-first national strategy. As described in the Nixon-Sato Joint Communique of 1969, "security of the R.O.K. is vital to that of Japan."<sup>19</sup> According to the new provision of 1975 agreed between Schlesinger and Sakata, "the security of the entire Korean peninsula is vital to Japan."<sup>20</sup> At any rate it is apparent that Japan places heavy strategic value on either a part of, or the entire peninsula. This security of the Korean peninsula is directly related to the Japanese interests in building an economic superpower.

Despite the fact that it did become an economic superpower, its economy-centered national policy still prevails. For that reason Japan preferred, and still prefers, to maintain a position of equally friendly relations with both China and Russia. Japan wants to keep Soviet influence out of the area

while maintaining economic links with the U.S.S.R. In February, 1978 Japan signed a long-term trade agreement with the P.R.C. worth twenty billion dollars over the next eight years, followed by a treaty of peace and friendship in August, 1978.

On April 28, 1952 Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security and Assistance Treaty on which Japan's strategic defense has been heavily based. Since the U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula acts as the stabilizing force, Japan has felt no necessity to worry about the R.O.K. even though the R.O.K. is the bulwark of the Japanese defense system. Japan has not been forced to face the possibility of being involved in military conflict. A continuation of the current U.S. role in the R.O.K. is thus vital to the military security of Japan which is an absolute prerequisite to the economy-first national policy.<sup>19</sup>

Thus far, Japan has been concentrating for its own sake on economic interests with minimum concern for the military threat. Present trends however point to a growing military role for Japan in regional affairs as the threat is felt all the more keenly not only because of aggressive moves by the Soviet Union, but also the growing apprehension about the reality of the American security commitments in the Far East, caused by U.S. policies in Southeast Asia and Taiwan, as well as recent moves to pull U.S. ground troops out of South Korea. Nevertheless "Japan will not replace the United States as South Korea's principal guardian,"<sup>21</sup> as former Premier Sato

has repeatedly pointed out. Japan's constitution, as presently interpreted, prevents a R.O.K.-Japan military alignment; the majority (54 %) of Japanese polled in 1970 opposed sending the Self Defense Force (SDF) to the R.O.K. in the event of a North Korean attack while only 7 percent favored such a move, although this may have changed to some extent over the past decade.

On the peninsula, Japanese foreign policy is characterized by de jure recognition of the R.O.K. and de facto recognition of the D.P.R.K. Yet, Japan's "two-Koreas" foreign policy consistently shuns politico-military relations and concentrates on economics. Japan eagerly sought to improve its trade markets in South Korea following normalization, but trade with the Communist D.P.R.K. has also increased since 1965.

Japan's government of today, compared to the pre-1945 one, involves added democratic methods and recognizes an increasingly pluralistic society. Foreign policy-making must reconcile more varied interests than did Japan's former authoritarian and militaristic government. Japan's military, constrained by Article IX of the Constitution, enjoys no real influence in foreign affairs; a militaristic elite, similar to the one of the 1930's, does not exist in Japan today. The business community seeks larger foreign markets, regardless of the trade partner's ideology; opposition parties are dedicated to neutralism; the public strongly supports Article IX; and

the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) favors balanced, non-dogmatic policies. All these factors exert heavy pressure on the Prime Minister and Cabinet in their foreign policy-making, and are likely to prevent resumption of Japan's pre-1945 Korean policy. Yet, Japan moved to strengthen the conventional forces of the SDF during the Fourth Five-Year Defense Program (1972-1976).

The Japanese SDF are being strengthened with F-15 fighters, P-3C antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and other military purchases over the next four to five years.<sup>23</sup> Because of the instability generated by the projected withdrawal of the United States ground forces in the R.O.K., a significant increase in defense expenditures is predicted in the near future. Besides an option of such a massive conventional arms buildup, Japan, in light of the possible disengagement of the American forces in the R.O.K., could break with the U.S. and adopt an independent, Gallist foreign policy, associate itself more closely with China or Russia, decide to go nuclear, or combine any of<sup>24</sup> the preceding possibilities.

These changes in Japanese foreign and defense policies could very seriously affect extremely important U.S. interests, the consequences of which for the U.S. could be disastrous. All in all, Tokyo's objective toward the Korean peninsula appears to be consolidating and stabilizing the existing situation of a divided Korea so that it can continue to seek economic utilitarianism.

## U.S.A.

Historically there have been several models for resolving the Korean problem. In 1905 the U.S. adopted a hands-off policy under the "Taft-Katsura Agreement" which granted Imperial Japan a free hand to pursue an expansionist policy in Asia.<sup>25</sup> Another seed of catastrophe was sown on the peninsula by the "Yalta Agreement" of 1945, which for the first time signaled internationally the division of the peninsula as co-existence<sup>26</sup> was agreed upon between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Intense United States interest in the peninsula developed after World War II. Like the U.S.S.R. in North Korea, the U.S. played the instrumental role in forming the R.O.K. in the south. The U.S. omitted South Korea from its Pacific defense perimeter in early 1950, but dispatched military forces to rescue the Republic in the Korean War. Then after the war was over, "anti-hegemonism" was virtually accepted by the concerned strong powers such that neither monopoly nor co-existence<sup>27</sup> prevails on the peninsula. Since 1954, the U.S.A. and the R.O.K. have been bound together by an alliance involving national security assurances and economic aid from the United States.

The U.S.-R.O.K. alliance has contributed four essential factors to East Asian politics. First, the alliance has been essential to the postwar stability of Japan, particularly in the early postwar period. Second, the alliance has enabled the U.S. to wield primary deterrent influence in Korea, an area

that, if left alone, might have become entirely communized. Further, without U.S. influence, a Communist Korean peninsula may have become a confrontation point between a rising Japan and one or both of the Communist superpowers. Third, the alliance has been crucial to the generally enviable political and economic recovery exhibited by the R.O.K. In return, the U.S. enjoys staunch allied support from South Korea. Fourth, the alliance has developed a prestigious R.O.K. military forces capable of manning its own defense.

Recent U.S. policy under the President Carter's administration, however, sought to disengage the U.S. as such an essential participant on the peninsula, although the formal R.O.K.-U.S. alliance remains intact.

From the United States standpoint functions of the Korean peninsula can be summarized as follows. First, the peninsula is functioning as a military-strategic advanced base for the security of Japan. The peninsula enables the U.S. to seek its most vital interest in Asia, that is, maintenance of status quo in its relations with Japan. A communized Korean peninsula will place Japan in a very delicate position in terms of self-defense, and in turn Japanese reaction to the situation would directly affect the security of the United States. The consequences for the U.S. could be disastrous. For example, Japan might align itself more closely diplomatically, with one or both of the two big communist powers.

Second, the peninsula functions as a shoulder contain-



ing the expansion of the continental powers and, to a lesser degree, of Japan. It would cost a lot more than it does now for the U.S. to meet the threat by the continental powers without a buffer zone like the Korean peninsula. The balance of power in the Northeast Asia can be maintained only when expansion of those powers is properly restrained through the security of the peninsula. Although the United States is employing a "one barbarian against another technique" <sup>28</sup> in an attempt to constrain the U.S.S.R. through normalization of relations with the P.R.C., the Korean peninsula will still emerge as an important shoulder position due to its geographical peculiarity involved in Sino-Soviet relations. With regard to Japan the United States would better contain it, in a long run, from rapidly expanding into Korea for Japan might be able to precede the U.S. in terms of its economic relation with the R.O.K. In this regard Japanese expansion into the R.O.K. and further into the Asian continent can be contained through the strategic base, the Korean peninsula.

Third, the Korean peninsula has a significant meaning from the political and economic viewpoint as the U.S. desires to retain an effective influence in the region. Through the great amount of investment mainly involving security assistance during and after the Korean War the United States succeeded in acquiring a firmly determined anti-communist rampart whose people are strongly pro-American. This rampart allows the U.S. to exercise a political influence in the region, which is

closely associated with economic field as well when viewed in terms of the U.S. enormous economic investment into the peninsula. While the U.S. remains the largest market for South Korean exports, the R.O.K. has become the twelfth largest market for U.S. exports.<sup>29</sup>

Present U.S. policy toward the R.O.K. is based on Nixon Doctrine which attempted to retrieve the post-Vietnam War inferiority of power vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. It elaborated the principles of the partnership, superiority of power and negotiation. It further provided that the U.S. would keep all treaty commitments, provide a nuclear shield to preclude coercion of allies, and provide economic and military assistance to assist other nations while they provide the manpower to deter local aggressions. There is no doubt that the U.S. wishes to prevent war and avoid any conflict in the region at now and in the future as the security of the R.O.K. is at least crucial,<sup>30</sup> if not vital, to the U.S. position in the Western Pacific.

How to meet its (U.S.) interest in this region in the future is, however, a great concern to the R.O.K. Inducing through the historical evidence, Mr. Kang of the R.O.K. Army College expressed his opinion on the U.S. policy perspective toward the R.O.K. as follows:

1st Phase: Influence the D.P.R.K. such that it breaks away from the U.S.S.R. and becomes pro-Chinese.

2nd Phase: Improve the relations between the D.P.R.K. and Japan.

3rd Phase: Improve the relations between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.

4th Phase: Make the D.P.R.K. give up its policy of unification by force and accept a system of peaceful co-existence with the R.O.K.<sup>31</sup>

Up until the end of 1978 power spectrum looked something like Figure 1, which implies that a balance of power on and around the peninsula exists. After succeeding in normalizing relations




Fig.1.A Power Spectrum Model      Fig.2. A Power Spectrum Model  
with the P.R.C. as of 1 January, 1979 the U.S. attempts to control the D.P.R.K. through China and deal with the Korean peninsula as an individual and local issue as depicted in Figure 2. In other words, what is at stake is the localization of the Korean peninsula through detente or rapprochement with the strong powers. This implies that balance of power may be maintained around the peninsula; but that may not be true on the peninsula. In fact military confrontation between the two Koreas may become more serious.

#### COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH WITH THE NORTH

Since the Korean Armistice of 1953, both South and North Korea steadily rebuilt their armed forces and national economy with the assistance of their superpower patrons.

Ironically enough their goals remain the same, that is, the achievement of unification. Their approaches, however, to the attainment of their goals are quite different. The current North Korean leadership ultimately values unification more than peace, rejects the notion of a divided Korea, and is committed to the realization of a united communist Korea. On the other hand, South Koreans desire more strongly to avoid war than to achieve unification or to impose their way of life on North Korea. This section describes two important elements of national power - military and economic - of the two Koreas to illustrate present status and prospects of the balance of indigenous power on the peninsula.

#### MILITARY ASPECT

Overall military forces of the two Koreas are described in Table 1. Patterened after the U.S. Army, the R.O.K. Army has developed strong combat units, which are positioned near the DMZ to provide a forward defense to protect Seoul. The R.O.K. Homeland Reserve Force is maintained elsewhere for rear security and counter-infiltration tasks in the event of conflict.

The R.O.K. Navy has a comparatively well-balanced fleet of surface ships. The destroyers are all former U.S. navy ships built during World War II and transferred to South Korea. The R.O.K. is modernizing its coastal patrol fleet with two new types of craft; a multimission patrol ship (PSMM) and a coastal patrol and interdiction craft (CPIC). Amphibious force is only

Table 1. Military Capabilities of South Korea and North Korea

	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
	<u>Total Armed Forces</u>	
Personnel	678,000 2.5 mill paramilitary force	600,600 2.8 mill Homeland Def Res Force
	<u>Army</u>	
Personnel	600,000	520,000
Divisions	40	20
Infantry	35	19
Mechanized	3	1
Tank	2	0
Independent(Light) Inf Bde	17	2
Independent Tank Regt(Arm Bde)	6	2
River Crossing Regt	1	0
Tanks		
Medium	2,500	860
Light Amphibious	150	0
APCs	1,000	570
Assault Guns	100	0
Field Artillery Pieces	4,000	2,000
Multiple Rocket Launchers	1,900	0
Mortars	9,000	5,300
SSM	34 FROG 5/7	Honest John
	<u>Navy</u>	
Personnel	31,000	48,000
Bases	18	8
Naval Combatants	425-450	80-90
Destroyers	0	10
Destroyers Escorts	0	9
Patrol Frigates	6-7	7
Missile Attack Boats	19	8
Submarines	19	0
Coastal Patrol Types	300	60
Landing Craft	90	21
	<u>Air Force</u>	
Personnel	47,000	32,600
Primary Jet-capable airfields	20	12
Fighters/Fighter Bombers	615	362
	120 MIG-21	60 F-4D/E
	110 MIG-19	220 F-5A/B/E/F
	340 MIG-15/17	50 F-86F
	20 SU-7	
Light Bombers	85 (IL-28)	0
Transports	251 (includes 240 AN-2/24)	34
Helicopters	65	74
	<u>Air Defense</u>	
AA Guns	5,500	700
SAM	250 SA-2	80 Hawk 40 Nike-Her.

\* Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1980-81 (London, 1980), pp.70-71, and various unclassified sources.

large enough to fit a force of several battalions to conduct divisionary raids during attack. The R.O.K. has no submarines, which would be useful for parolling coastal waters against North Korean submarines. Four of the destroyers that had been modernized by the U.S. Navy have limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.

The R.O.K. Air Force (ROKAF) is equipped with F-5s, F-86s, and F-4D/Es. Without substantial augmentation, the ROKAF would be hard pressed to repel a sizable North Korean air attack. Although the ROKAF is fairly modern and its pilots capable, these factors do not compensate for the disparity in numbers of aircraft between the North and South. Furthermore, the ROKAF operates from fewer fields than the North Korean Air Force, which makes their force more vulnerable than the North's.

North Korea remains committed to the unification of the peninsula on its own terms and has devoted considerable resources to developing a military option as part of its overall reunification strategy. The armed forces have improved significantly, with much of the effort devoted to creating a strong offensive capability. The North Korean force is well-trained, well-equipped and offensive-oriented.

The North Korean Army (NKA), fourth largest among the world's communist armies, is patterned after the Soviet Army, with emphasis on large armored forces and on heavy artillery and mortar fire support. It is deployed offensively in close proximity to the DMZ. Although the NKA is equipped primarily

with Soviet equipment, most of its military items are at present locally designed and produced. North Korea's over 2,500 tanks represent considerable offensive power. Light tanks and APCs have been provided by the P.R.C.<sup>32</sup> As far as POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) is concerned, the NKA relies heavily on both the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. Of particular note are 34 FROG-5/7 surface-to-surface missiles with a maximum range of 70 kilometers, sufficient to reach Suwon from North Korean territory.

The North Korean Navy (NKN) is essentially a coastal defense force. However, sizable torpedo boat and amphibious assault forces, 19 attack submarines, and 19 missile attack boats amounting in total to 450 combatants add an important offensive capabilities. The most formidable threat to the R.O.K. shipping is North Korea's submarines. In addition, the NKN has a fleet of small, fast motorboats, which could be used to infiltrate the South with terrorists and agents. These forces could be used to support operations against coastal areas of the South, impede the R.O.K.'s shipping in contiguous waters, and provide rear area coastal security. The NKN is remarkably superior over the R.O.K. Navy in number of combatants and firepower.

North Korea maintains a large air force with over 600 jet combat aircraft at about 20 airfields. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) enjoys superiority over South Korea in numbers of combat aircraft and pilots. The NKAF is capable of

performing air defense mission as well. The force is large, and given a short flight time to Seoul and to the South's defensive positions, it could launch a large scale surprise attack that would be formidable to defend against.

It is known with certainty that, starting in the early 1970s, the North Koreans have been engaged in a major military build-up. North Korea now has a strength of around 678,000 men; a substantial increase over the 467,000 with which had been previously credited Pyongyang, and it has many more tanks and artillery than had been previously thought (Table 1 and 2).

Table 2. Military Manpower of South Korea and North Korea, 1975-1980 (thousands)

Year	75	76	77	78	79	80
North Korea	467	495	500	512	672	678
South Korea	625	595	635	642	619	600

\* Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1979-80, pp.95-96, and \_\_\_\_\_, 1980-81, p.97.

The size of the NKAF and NKN also has increased. As far as the size of the forces is concerned, the North does not have any limitation whatsoever whereas the South is limited to 600,000 ceiling by the agreement with the U.S. The North Korean forces are armed, configured and deployed in such a manner as to enable them rapidly to initiate large-scale hostilities.<sup>33</sup> The North continues to have a current military advantage over the R.O.K. in almost every critical areas.<sup>34</sup> The intentions of North Korea to communize the entire peninsula were clearly expressed by Premier Kim, who promised to start a new war whenever the time is ripe.<sup>35</sup> North Korea has the capability,



on its own, to execute a large-scale invasion of the R.O.K. with little warning and "can wage it for weeks without outside support."<sup>36</sup> It seems clear that the existing capabilities of the South Korean Armed Forces are not sufficient to ensure that the risk of North Korean miscalculations would remain at an acceptably low level in the absence of U.S. military support. Today, except for what the U.S. can put into the scales, as the former Commanding General of the ROK/US Combined Field Army, Lieutenant General (retired) Cushman said, the military balance on the Korean peninsula favors the North, and it will continue to do so for several years to come.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to the size of the armed forces, there are a few more points that must be discussed to have a better understanding of the two Koreas in terms of overall military situations.

It must be noted first of all that the superiority of the North in manpower, aircraft, tanks and ships is sharpened by some intangible peculiarities of the North Korean communist state itself.

One is the significantly longer periods of military service required by the North as shown in Table 3. Extended

Table 3. Terms of Service, South and North Korea (years)

Service	Army	Navy	Air Force
North Korea	7	5	3-4
South Korea	2 1/2	2 1/2	3

\* Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1980-81, pp.70-71

service enables North Korea to accomodate higher level of competency and expertise in a given period. Pivotal to the North's advantage, however, is the political and military orientation of North Korean forces, which are configured more for attack than defense. Thus the initiative lies always on the side of the North. As evidence, a comparable picture emerges with respect to military manpower. Worldwide, the figure is about 6.5 military per thousand of population, and seldom is it more than 30 per thousand unless a country is mobilized for war. In 1980 it was <sup>40</sup> per thousand in North Korea in contrast with <sup>38</sup> 17 in the R.O.K. It is also backed up by the fact that the North is spending far greater portion of its Gross National Product (GNP) to defense expenditures than the South, as discussed below.

As for defense industries, Pyongyang currently produces all but a few of its most sophisticated weapon for which it depends on Russia and China. Meanwhile, the defense industry of the R.O.K. also has been remarkably developed to a point where various field guns, tanks, missiles and warships are produced domstically. <sup>39</sup> And the R.O.K. probably will be producing increasingly larger and more sophisticated weapon systems within the next few years. It is to be expected that the South will become progressively more self-sufficient in terms of the production and maintenance of war materiel provided that the government continues to commit to its development and to make efforts to increase financial, scientific,

technological, and industrial capabilities.

North Korea maintains relations with the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. based on the Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance which were signed in July, 1961. According to these treaties both Russia and China are committed to "automatic and immediate" defense of North Korea in the event of external aggression.<sup>40</sup> North Korea appreciates the very fact that competition between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. prevents either side from attaining clear paramount influence in the northern part of the peninsula. On the other hand South Korea and the U.S.A., according to their Mutual Defense Treaty, are bound to "consult" together when either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack.<sup>41</sup> Article II of the Treaty describes "the Parties ... will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement (emphasis mine) to implement this Treaty...."<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, according to the Article III, "each Party ... would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process."<sup>43</sup>

Although China and Russia may not be interested in a new war on the Korean peninsula, they would not let North Korea be extinguished in the event Kim Il-sung unilaterally invades the R.O.K. since both of them have a semipermanent commitment to the continued existence of North Korea.<sup>44</sup> Even if they dissolved their alliance with the North for one reason or another, it seems very unlikely that they would permit its destruction and the creation of a united non-communist Korea.

In contrast, it is not clear whether the United States - to say nothing of Japan - would be as committed to the existence of the R.O.K. in the future as Russia and China would to North Korea or as it did during the Korean War. It is also unclear whether the U.S. would return to prevent the destruction of the R.O.K. once the Mutual Defense Treaty had been abrogated as a result of the possible withdrawal of the U.S. forces in South Korea.<sup>45</sup> In brief, the R.O.K.'s security relationship with its ally is far less binding than is the North's security ties with its allies.

There is a command and control problem in South Korean Armed Forces. Kim Il-sung appears to have developed a personality cult that is at its zenith, and he has "complete control" over the government and people of the North. In the South, the United Nations Command undertook to maintain operational control over the South Korean Armed Forces at the time the Armistice was signed in 1953, and it has been that way since then. The UNC is in a position to monitor and control the activation of the South Korean forces as well as other allied forces in South Korea.

Another serious problem South Korea is faced with concerns intelligence activities. At the present time South Korea is not yet capable of monitoring North Korean behaviors for signs of impending attack whereas adequate warning time is critical for a successful defense of South Korea which has no space to trade for time. Much of the rugged mountainous terrain

makes it very difficult to detect enemy aircraft flying at low altitude. - North Korea has over 240 AN-2 transports capable of lifting nearly 3,000 troops with full combat equipments. Even for jets the short warning period makes it difficult to scramble interceptors in time as it takes only three minutes for the enemy MIG-21's to fly to Seoul from the North fighter bases.<sup>46</sup> Thus South Korea is vulnerable to preemptive air strikes by North Korea.

As for the nuclear umbrella, the United States has promised continuously to provide the R.O.K. with it. However there is no reliable unclassified information on either the number or kind of nuclear weapons currently assigned to the United States Forces in Korea (USFK), or on how many are to be withdrawn and in accordance with what schedule. All that is known to South Korea is that the U.S. has had tactical nuclear weapons there in the past, as stated by then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and that former President Carter has stated that he intended to remove these weapons.<sup>47</sup> Whether the issue, in reference to these tactical nuclear weapons, is primarily their deployment or their use is not that important for the very existence of those weapons plays the role as the deterrent, which is all that counts.

From a military viewpoint the R.O.K. is thus, as always has been, in much more disadvantageous position vis-a-vis North Korea due to the very fact that it is basically defensively oriented and furthermore depends heavily on the outside


power for its own defense without proper authority and capability to control its own forces.

#### ECONOMIC ASPECT

National economy deserves discussion here in a sense that national security considerations, in any nation, cannot be adequately discussed independently of its development and potentialities of the economic basis.

As the Korean War ended in 1953 South Korea was left with most of the peninsula's limited agricultural resources while North Korea inherited the bulk of the peninsula's mineral and hydroelectric resources and most of the existing heavy industrial base. For almost a decade after the war's end, South Korea, as a result, was incapable of overcoming the vicious cycle of poverty and mineral economic growth. However in 1962, under the new leadership, the R.O.K. launched an unprecedented economic development plan. Thanks to a series of successful five-year plans, the economy of the R.O.K. has since developed drastically catapulting the country into the ranks of the semi-developed industrial nations. Since 1962 the R.O.K. has sustained one of the highest economic growths in the world with an annual real growth rate of its GNP, averaging 9.3 percent, a performance not exceeded by any other nation. 1969 was the take-off point where South Korea started surpassing the North in per capita GNP, an advantage Pyongyang has had since partition in 1945 (See Figure 3). In 1979 its

Figure 3. Comparison of GNP and PER CAPITA GNP



\* Source: Korea Development Research Center, Comparison of Economic Status between South Korea and North Korea(1979)

economy recorded a per capita GNP of 1,597 dollars. This remarkable economic development enabled the expansion and development of professional armed forces. A defense tax was introduced in 1975 to implement the force improvement plan (FIP), as a compensatory measure for the ending of Grant Aid from the U.S. which was to stop within a year. Recently this defense surcharge was extended for another five year period and the tax rate was raised to increase the defense expenditure to six percent of GNP.

As North Korea is one of the most tightly closed countries in the world, detailed knowledge of the state of its economy is difficult to obtain. It was disclosed however that during the early 1970s North Korea's attempt to upgrade its industrial base ended in failure resulting in large foreign debt and continuing default. Due to the serious debt problem North Korea fell short of its Six-Year Plan (1971-76) industrial targets, and these economic difficulties continued to exist since then, even after launching the new seven-year plan that started in 1978. The available data reveals that North Korea has spent annually during the last decade approximately 13.4 percent, on the average, of its GNP for military purposes despite all those economic difficulties (See Table 4).

Table 4. Defense Expenditures of South Korea and North Korea, 1975-1980 (\$ mill/% of GNP)

Year	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
North Korea	878/na	957/11.2	1000/10.5	1200/11.4	1231/11.2	1300/na
South Korea	943/5.1	1548/6.2	2033/6.5	2586/5.6	3219/5.5	3460/na

\*Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1979-80, pp.95-96, and \_\_\_\_\_, 1980-81, p.97.



This military overspending is one of the basic reasons for the weakness in Pyongyang's economy. Another reason is overplanning, pushed forward in the name of Kim Il-sung's ideology, "juche."<sup>49</sup> Overplanning has eliminated whatever incentive there may have been in the communist society for the people to work hard. Nevertheless North Korea is pushing hard to resolve this problem by employing many economy experts in the cabinet. It is very unlikely, though, that Kim Il-sung would be willing to cut military expenditures as he is so anxious to see his promise of communizing the peninsula realized. Thus the impact of this foreign debt problem will fall heavily on North Korea over the upcoming years.

The North is not the only one with problem. The South is, at present, faced with a few thorny economic problems as well. Although it is very true to say that drastic growth of the South Korean economy owes much the export expansion policy, too much emphasis on it along with political instability has brought failure in price stabilization, recurrence of a large current account deficit, and the improvement of social welfare resulting in ever-increasing inflation. In 1980, for the first time ever since 1956, the South Korean economy marked minus growth rate (See Figure 3). South Korea's exports, which had been the engine of growth since the early 1960s, may face many challenges in the upcoming years as well. The slowing down of the developed economies will slacken demand for imports. Global recession and increased protectionism in the developed world may not wither away soon. Competition with other

developing countries will become intensified. And recurring energy crisis may not be averted. Despite all these possibilities and although South Koreans are still suffering from the effects of the slump, the longterm forecasts look hopeful in that initial signals of economic recovery are seen, along with the political stability restored, as the economic forecast index has been rising and letters of credit have been up since November, 1980.<sup>50</sup> According to a Korean economic expert, signals of recovery will be fully visible by fall, 1981.<sup>51</sup> It is thus believed that South Korea will be able to achieve by 1982 an eight to nine percent growth rate in GNP, almost equal to the momentum piled up in the miracle years of the 1970s.<sup>52</sup> Barring large-scale war and sudden imbalance of power on the peninsula and assuming that real GNP grows nine percent in the South starting in 1982 and six percent in the North continuously, South Korea is, therefore, likely to emerge in 1990 with an economy about five times the size of the North Korean economy (See Figure 3). This means that assuming the South and North spends respectively as much as six and fifteen percent of their GNP on military expenditures, South Korea becomes able to allocate 4.74 billion dollars (1976 US \$) in 1990 for military purpose whereas North Korea 2.25 billion dollars (Refer to Table 4). Provided that the aforementioned conditions - no war, no sudden imbalance of power, and continuous economic growth - be met during the coming decade, by 1990 the military balance of power will favor the South, and the South Korean

economy will be fully able to sustain the self-defense expenditures.

#### POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

In the context of the four major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, four possible scenarios are envisioned for the peninsula:

- A. North Korean dominance of the peninsula
- B. South Korean dominance of the peninsula
- C. A neutralized Korea
- D. Status quo

The most important determinant of the future destiny for the peninsula is without doubt the role of the USFK because the military balance on the peninsula still favors the North. Korean history shows that when the United States, with its great power and leadership capacities, has remained firm and resolute in defense of the freedom and security of its ally, peace and stability have been maintained and development has gone forward. On the other hand, when the United States has retreated from its position as defender of peace and stability, not only was progress impeded but open hostilities broke loose. Since the dark days of the Korean War, the continuous and resolute American military presence in the peninsula, coupled with strong American security commitments, has helped sustain the peace. Such an environment was essential to enable the South Korean people to proceed with the development and modernization of

their economic system and political institutions. The deterrent effect of forward-based ground forces is doubtlessly greater than their relatively small size suggests. What really accounts most is the psychological impact on the two Koreas. As Dr. Clough of the Brookings Institution says, "it is impossible to be sure that Kim Il-sung would be deterred by South Korea's present military strength from mounting a blitzkrieg against Seoul if U.S. ground forces pulled out tomorrow."<sup>53</sup> The very presence of American troops has been maintaining the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Even from Pyongyang's standpoint, the presence of U.S. Forces is conceivably the most decisive consideration that keeps the North Korean leadership from any attempt to communize the entire peninsula on its own terms.<sup>54</sup>

Besides, the presence of U.S. Forces improves the climate for Japanese trade and investment in South Korea by diminishing the risk of conflict. It counts the nearby presence of Soviet and Chinese forces and the corollary influence of these nations in Korea and provides a firm base for the coordination of U.S. and Japanese policies toward South Korea. Furthermore the presence of U.S. Forces strengthens the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense not only of that nation, but by extension, of Japan itself.

In the context of their interests in the region the four major powers seem to be clearly desiring maintenance of peace on the peninsula. Even China and the U.S.S.R. are not

in favor of U.S. withdrawal because they want to keep any potential conflict in U.S. control.<sup>55</sup> And their support for peace implies acceptance of the status quo as the future scenario for the Korean peninsula. This is, from their respective point of view, the least undesirable for the peninsula as long as the U.S. forces are positioned there and U.S. commitments are firmly guaranteed.

The "status quo" serves dual purposes for the United States. On the one hand it can contain the expansions of Chinese and Russian influencing power into the Pacific and Southeast Asia. On the other, it can also promote its relationship with Japan in pursuance of its national interests both military and economic.

Japan wants by all means to maintain peace and stability in the region for Japanese economy heavily depends on international trade. Japan certainly wishes to continue to pursue its economic development under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. At the same time it is maintaining a close relationship with China while placing a string on the expansion of Russian power.

On the Communists' side, the Soviets seek improvement of relations with Japan so as to restrict close ties among the U.S., Japan and China. To do that the Soviets attempt to promote detente with the United States.

China is concentrating with its entire national might on the four modernizations. To accomplish this China does not

want to be disturbed by the surrounding environment. China is thus earning time to strengthen its posture vis-a-vis Russia while avoiding two-front war by fixing the three major powers through status quo on the Korean peninsula.

Thus the status quo is in conformity with the interests of all four major powers in the region as long as U.S. forces remain committed.

More important is what if the USFK are withdrawn, whenever it might happen, without any appropriate compensatory measure taken to fill the power vacuum. At present the question appears to be more serious than ever before because the United States long-term commitment to the R.O.K. is in doubt, although it would not let South Korea be destroyed for the time being.<sup>56</sup> That would be like an invitation to open-house for the North Korea itself as well as for its allies, China and Russia.

When the U.S. was perceived to be withdrawing soon from the Korean peninsula, evidence showed that both Koreas attempted to approach their enemy's allies. South Korea has expressed willingness to develop relations with "nonhostile" communist countries and has made various overtures to the Soviet Union and China so as not to be isolated and deserted in an open field surrounded by the enemies only.<sup>57</sup> In contrast, North Korea's intention was to stimulate the international mood in its favor in order to expedite the U.S. withdrawal by taking this opportunity to the maximum extent. It already trades with and has other forms of interchange with Japan. It has also

admitted several Americans including some high ranking officials on visits and has proposed negotiating a peace treaty with the United States. Kim Il-sung is indeed working vigorously to gain a stronger international position.

For the South Koreans, withdrawal of the U.S. Forces entails abrogation of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, as evidenced in Taiwan, which can be escalated into that of the ROK-US alliance. It might be perceived by the U.S. that it can prevent the possible conflict in the Korean peninsula by maintaining normalization of relations with China and the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. China might be so contained. There is, however, no viable alternative to keep Russia from motivating North Korea to "liberate the peninsula." Kim Il-sung, in his own words, promised to start a new war violating the truce if the U.S. pulls out of South Korea.<sup>58</sup> North Korea might not even need support from Russia in that case once it becomes evident that the U.S. would not return to the peninsula. In the absence of the USFK, therefore, with the military balance in favor of North Korea, the scenario for the Korean peninsula will very likely be the North Korean dominance of the peninsula.

Scenario "B" and "C" are possible but too far to be realistic. Especially Scenario "B," that is, "South Korean dominance of the peninsula," is almost unthinkable from the South Korea's standpoint, unless there is a firm assurance that Korea becomes historical example of the realization of

the Convergence Theory. Otherwise the only way that this scenario can be realized is by means of force, which has been constantly rejected by South Korea. The constitution of the R.O.K. clearly states that it will not invade any country to become a destroyer of peace and stability. If South Koreans were to choose between avoiding war at the expense of unification and achieving unification at the expense of war on the peninsula, it would be the former without any doubt. Furthermore, this scenario will not be tolerated by both China and Russia simply because it is unacceptable to them in the context of their national interests.

Scenario "C," "A neutralized Korea" is only possible after either scenario "A" or "B" are realized. A "Two neutralized Koreas" is unthinkable because it is a greater hindrance to unification than the status quo, and unification is the ultimate goal of both Koreas. The logical step for the Korean peninsula to become neutralized, if it ever happens, would be scenario "D"- "A" or "B"- "C" in that order. However scenario "C" is not even acceptable to any of the four major powers as the strategic importance of the peninsula is too significant to be ignored by them.

#### SUMMARY

The Korean peninsula is one area where the interests of the four major powers - the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., and Japan - converge. From the great powers' point of view it



is indeed a part of the pattern of competition as being a  
"key terrain"<sup>59</sup> in military terms. Furthermore it is in the  
pattern of the direct opposition as each of the two Koreas  
tries to impose its own ideology on its opponent. While the  
chance is very dim to see any form of hybrid out of these two  
extremes, history shows that there is a great possibility for  
the balance of power on the peninsula to be broken further in  
North Korea's favor at any moment. Thus far, vast economic and  
military assistance programs and a sizable military presence  
have made the U.S. commitment to the R.O.K. highly visible.  
After almost thirty years, however, since the Armistice was  
signed, popular support for this commitment is lessening for  
various reasons such as the disenchantment from foreign invol-  
vement and international obligations arising out of the Viet-  
nam War and a growing concentration of money and attention on  
U.S. domestic problems. In the face of the ever-increasing  
threat from the North this change in the surrounding environ-  
ment raises serious doubts for the South Koreans who have  
been and still are struggling for the attainment of self-  
reliant defense capability and self-sufficient economy, as to  
the credibility of the U.S. commitment. As far as military  
balance on the peninsula is concerned, the very presence of  
U.S. Forces in Korea has been a very important, if not the  
most important, deterrent to North Korean aggression. In the  
context of their respective interests, all the major powers,  
including the U.S. itself who is the decision-maker for its

troop withdrawal, do not want to see any major change on the peninsula and instead desire maintenance of peace. This entails acceptance of "status quo." In case the U.S. withdrawal does occur in an untimely manner, however, creating a power vacuum, Kim Il-sung is very likely to make another attempt to liberate South Korea with or without outside support. If that happens, the U.S.S.R. may be forced to give a hand to North Korea whether it wants or not so as a means of expanding its influencing power in the region. This will very likely lead to North Korean dominance of the peninsula."

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## CHAPTER IV. ALTERNATIVES

### OVERVIEW

The small state is a state lacking the military power of its own to carry out a policy by force against its direct opponent and/or a large state for any protracted period.<sup>1</sup> In this regard the R.O.K. has been, ever since the Armistice of 1953, one of the states that could not be removed from the category of traditional "small" because it has been dependent on someone else for the protection of its inhabitants. It has even been a weak state as it has never had the adequate power to protect itself from the military onslaught of its direct opponent reinforced by superpower patrons.

Very important during a period of danger is the ability and willingness of the small state to employ forces to the limit in order to resist invasion, and of course, it is important that its enemy perceives this ability and willingness. Related to this is the concept of "independence," which is one of the most basic national objectives pursued by every nation in the international arena. The proper usage of the term "independence" is to denote the status of a state which controls its own external relations without dictation from other states. It means "freedom from control by other states."<sup>2</sup> In the sense that no country has total independence, it is a function of its relative power relationships with the other

countries of the world. Nevertheless, small states have far less choice, relative to great powers, in determining - on the basis of their own perceived self-interest - which commitments and alliances they will honor and which they will not. Here arises a necessity for small states to secure denial capability so as not to succumb to the dictation of their enemies, thereby achieving and maintaining independence. To achieve the ability and willingness to resist aggression, the R.O.K. must seek the least common multiple, that is, it must be prepared to deal with both threats: one direct, from communist North Korea, and the other indirect, from its supporting great powers. The reason is that the R.O.K. lies both in a pattern of direct opposition and in that of indirect superpower competition.

The importance of armed might for a small state like the R.O.K. is stressed in sufficient detail in the Machiavel-  
lian and Porcupine Theories. And there are other sources of influence and other instruments of power than armed might. The tools of statecraft include, for instance, the organizational: combinations of states may cooperate successfully to further their common interests. For the small state the art of diplomacy could be indeed the government's strong arm. Far more than states with large military potential, the small states must be able to protect themselves by adroit diplomatic use of favorable opportunities for advancing their interests.

Based on those theoretical guidelines and in consideration of the situational analyses discussed in chapter III,



this chapter introduces and analyzes the five alternatives through which a small state can maintain its independence, and suggests a best course of action for the R.O.K.

#### ALTERNATIVE #1 : ALLIANCE

This is a method of establishing an alliance relationship with a particular strong power. Sovereign nations may, under existing international conditions, form alliances, usually through a mutual defense treaty with other nations whose interests are similar or parallel. In reality a small state can be assured of its security by the concerned strong power insofar as that strong power's credibility of commitment remains firm. The present relationship between the United States and the R.O.K. exemplifies the situation.

This situation, however, has always presented a dilemma for the weak state that was so well-expressed by Rogers and Hammerstein in the lines of The King and I, in which the King of Siam sings:

Shall I join with other nations in alliance?  
If allies are weak, am I not best alone?  
If allies are strong with power to protect me,  
Might they not protect me out of all I own?

The distribution of benefits is likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance, as is the determination of policies. According to the de jure provision of a mutual defense treaty like the one between the U.S. and the R.O.K., the distribution of benefits within an alliance should ideally be one of complete mutuality. The fact is, however, that a

great power is the one with the ability to determine which commitment it will honor and which it will not. That is the unique benefit of being a great power. It has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak states against making alliances with strong ones except by absolute necessity.<sup>4</sup> Professor Morgenthau also points out that for an alliance to be operative those members of that alliance must agree not only on general objectives, but on policies and measures as well.<sup>5</sup> For almost every weak state alliance with a great power in the form of such bilateral military treaty is in fact needed simply because it is not in a position to protect itself from internal or external attack. Without the existence of some sort of military arm, many of these weak states could very well be faced with chaos and anarchy. They must have some means of preserving internal order and preventing external attack, as described in The Prince. While it is true that without such alliance many of the states would not be able to provide even the most elementary functions of government, that is, protection of its inhabitants, this sort of treaty tends to keep the weak state militarily dependent upon the concerned great power, and in large measure helps to perpetuate big power sphere of influence.<sup>6</sup> Regardless of the contents of the treaty, an alliance between two imbalanced powers tends to be unsymmetrical such that a sort of senior-junior relationship prevails in which

a weak state is "controlled" and forced by the great power to abandon some portion of its "independence." This case thus refers back to the old lesson in the Machiavellian Theory, as discussed in chapter II, which says that "allies" has a meaning to a prince only when he has "good arms" for he would, otherwise, become the allies' prisoner even with the victory.

The alliance between the U.S. and the R.O.K. is as typical as others, and thus is in reality one-sided and temporary rather than mutual and permanent. It does not even meet the standard to be effectively "operative" as stated by Professor Morgenthau. The United States will shun the alliance if it believes that it is secure enough to hold its own interests without due coordination with the R.O.K. or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantage to be expected. Will the United States risk even nuclear destruction at the hands of the communists in order to honor the alliance with the R.O.K.? The extremity of the risk involved casts doubt upon the operational quality of such an alliance. As an extraordinary case a weak state may well possess an asset which is of such good value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable, but even this does not seem to be the case for the R.O.K. Everything boils down to one single point: how does the U.S. evaluate the importance of the Korean peninsula from its security/national interests standpoint?

## ALTERNATIVE #2 : COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

This is a method of aligning among small states and acting collectively.<sup>7</sup> When collective self-defense is sought by the nations located close to each other geographically and/or placed under the similar circumstance from the security viewpoint, their collective effort could assure an effective denial capability commensurate with their mutual interests. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) movement is a good example that can be developed in the near future as an effective collective defense system in the region. For the time being, the R.O.K. may establish a collective defense system with Taiwan.

The basic purpose of such collective defense is to successfully and effectively deter war by marshaling in defense of the status quo such overwhelming strength that no nation will dare to resort to force in order to change the status quo.<sup>8</sup> To fulfill this purpose the system requires sufficient number of nations to muster such overwhelming strength. This, in turn, requires as close proximity as possible among those small states in terms of threat assessment, national interests, geographical location, etc. In other words, those member nations must have the same conception of security. What this collective defense system demands of the individual nations is to forsake national egotisms and the national policies serving them. The system expects the policies of the individual nations to be inspired

by the ideal of mutual assistance, subordination of their conflicting potential interests to the common good, and a spirit of self-sacrifice which will not shrink from the sacrifice of war should it be required by that ideal. As Professor Morgenthau put it, "one for all and all for one" is the watchword<sup>9</sup> of a collective defense system.

A collective defense system has an advantage in that the degree of control over "independence" is less than in alliance as the member nations perceive a common enemy and recognize the advantages to themselves of collective security. Although the provision of many of these collective defense agreements contains a phrase or a clause to the effect that an attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all, however, it is, in actual practice, very likely to have a predominating power among the member nations that usually happens to be the one making the decision as to whether attack has actually<sup>10</sup> occurred and whether the attacker is worthy of repulsion. As the number of member nations increases, it is very difficult, even in the absence of a predominating power, to reach a consensus so as to effect an effective countermeasure among the conflicting national interests when they are at stake in the face of actual war. Thus, the overall power of a collective defense system tends to be weaker than it could be. And the system of this nature, conceived as an instrument for the protection of status quo by peaceful means, defeats its avowed purpose and becomes an instrument of all-out war if a great

power launches itself or is involved in even indirectly in an aggression. Thus envisioned are some contradictions inherent in the very idea of collective defense when it is put into practice under the political conditions of the contemporary world.

History shows that of the greatest advantage to the small state was good relations with neighboring small states. Not only did this decrease the small state's vulnerability, but on occasion provided non-military support. Turkey and Spain, for example, had buried conflict with their closest historical rivals, Greece and France, respectively. Despite such a historical example, this alternative seems no longer valid in a practical sense in the Korean environment. Geographically there are only two countries with which the R.O.K. can organize a regional collective defense system: Japan and Taiwan. Japan is, however, out of question as Japan's present constitution prevents a R.O.K.-Japan military alignment.<sup>11</sup> The collective defense system with Taiwan only thus will not be able to muster such overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors, in which involvement of great power(s) is clearly envisaged, that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the collective system. Such a system that cannot fulfill one of the basic assumptions for the collective security then cannot be said to be fully operative. Furthermore Taiwan might not even feel the necessity of such a measure as anxiously as the R.O.K. for there are some speculations as to possible secret

agreements that might have been made between the U.S. and Taiwan in light of the U.S.-P.R.C. normalization of relations, which assure the security of Taiwan in an acceptable manner.

The R.O.K. also must understand the basic lesson of Machiavelli that it has to have "good arms" first to have a "good ally." If a similar international system to "the unit veto system," presented by Morton A. Kaplan, in which all actors possess such weapons that are capable of destroying other actors who attack them, can be established in the future as a consequence of significant improvement in weapons system, then such a collective defense system among small states might be able to assure adequate denial capability and thus function properly.<sup>12</sup> Although this "collective defense" alternative does not seem to be practical for the time being for one reason or another concerning either or both countries, the R.O.K. and Taiwan, the possibility of realization of such an international system in the future which would make viable small states' collective defense system, is somewhat reinforced by the Proposition 3 of the Porcupine Theory. In fact, the only factor common to both the R.O.K. and Taiwan is that they are both faced with communist threat. At present it is even difficult to validate the basic principle of the collective defense that requires collective measures against all aggression regardless of circumstances of power and interest due to the divergency of national interests in a particular crisis situation.

### ALTERNATIVE #3 : ONE BARBARIAN AGAINST ANOTHER

One of the methods for a small state to secure independence and security primarily through diplomacy is to offset the powers of influence of the concerned opponents - these could very well include great powers - by making the best use of their interests. A small state in which only one great power has interests is in a precarious position; however, the small state with which two or more great powers are concerned would superficially appear to be in great danger, but the very danger itself provides the opportunity for its diplomacy.<sup>13</sup> While the small state is unfortunate in being a point of conflict between great powers, it also reaps an advantage from not being entirely within the domain of one. Although Spain at the Straits of Gibraltar and Turkey at the Turkish Straits were a constant concern to the contending parties in World War II, and could not have defended their positions alone, both were spared participation in the war. They were certainly neither puppets nor pawns.

This method requires a high level of skill in diplomacy. The success depends on the diplomatic ability of the small state that is capable of borrowing the strength of one opponent to compensate for its limited power in dealing with another opponent. The probability of success will rise when there exist contradicting interests among the opponents. In case their interests are in conformity with each other, however, the small



state could be vitally vulnerable. Furthermore, if the small state controls one or more scarce commodities of strategic value to its opponents, its bargaining position can be measurably improved.<sup>14</sup> Sweden, for example, had its iron ore, which was so important to the German armament industry that the Nazis were careful not to interrupt its flow by hostile actions, while at the same time Sweden could obtain concessions from the Allies in return for stemming the flow.

The R.O.K. is confronted directly with North Korea and indirectly with the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. The R.O.K. could attempt a diplomacy to alienate North Korea from its superpower patrons individually or collectively. By shrewdly making the best use of this North Korea-P.R.C.-U.S.S.R. triangular relationship, South Korea could in fact isolate North Korea from the spheres of influence of those communist superpowers while at the same time avoiding a direct confrontation with them. A sort of mischief making could be plotted against North Korea to create dissensions in its relations with those superpowers. Although these measures can be taken, if forced by absolute necessity, this alternative does not seem to be practical. North Korea's relations with the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. is based on the Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance which were signed in July, 1961. And they are all tied to the basically same communist ideology. Although the Sino-Soviet dispute may continue to exist in the foreseeable future, their respective interests with respect to

North Korea or the entire Korean peninsula itself appears to be identical. And they both do not want to see the regional balance of power disturbed. Besides, the United States will be greatly displeased when the R.O.K. attempts an aggressive approach toward the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. That approach may even destroy the long-standing friendly relationship between the R.O.K. and the U.S. Thus the "one barbarian against another" technique for the R.O.K. accompanies too great a risk and requires such a high level skill in diplomacy that the R.O.K. can hardly afford at the present time.

#### ALTERNATIVE #4 : NEUTRALITY

A small state may also proclaim and maintain neutrality. While the "one barbarian against another" is a technique in which strengths of great powers are manipulated by the small state such that they become neutralized among one another, "neutrality" is a passive method that becomes only feasible through the recognition of neutrality of the concerned state by the agreement of the involved great powers. Neutrality is put into effect when it is agreed upon by the concerned great powers to proclaim the small state as a buffer zone for their own sake due to its geopolitical peculiarity. When such an agreement is reached, that small state can achieve and maintain independence at the expense of "minimum constraint," which entails that the small state must not do any supportive activities for any particular nation. <sup>15</sup> Neutrality works only

when more powerful neighbors are willing to respect it, or are not interested in taking what the neutral state may have to offer. The independence of small states may be assured because the international oligarchy of the great powers considers it to be a matter of their own joint interest. Geographically speaking, for the small state to stay neutral successfully, it is advantageous, almost essential, to be located away from the direct line of contact between the contending great powers.<sup>16</sup> When independence is assured, the successful pursuit of the neutrality policy by small state depends on a minimum of nuisance value corresponding interests of great powers or a situation in which neutral states can play against one another conflicting interests of great power. But neutrality in some disputes offers no protection from involvement in others. While some weaker countries were maintaining neutrality and non-alignment in the cold war seeing no benefit to themselves in getting involved in big power confrontations, they were simultaneously involved in disputes with their neighbors that necessitated their building military establishment with big power assistance. The World Court, the only judicial framework of international law, which encompasses the concept in which neutrality of a particular nation is recognized, has no power to insure that states appear before it or comply with its rulings. International law depends upon the voluntary cooperation of states to be effective; this means that neutrality can be ignored at any moment. Although some of the unambitious small states had some success in maintaining the neutrality even

during the protracted and extensive great power conflict of World War I, neutrality ceased during this period to be as respectable as it had been in the nineteenth century.

The R.O.K. may try this alternative as an intermediate step towards the ultimate goal of reunification until it achieves relative preponderance over North Korea in military and economic domains of national power. The question is whether those surrounding four great powers would buy that idea. While they all perceive the vital geo-strategic importance of the peninsula in view of their national interests, neutrality of the southern part of the peninsula would certainly not be considered to meet their interests best. China, for example, would not even support the cross recognition of the two Koreas. Even if they do recognize the neutrality of South Korea, it is totally meaningless unless the internal conflict between the two Koreas is resolved. Whereas neutrality is certainly desirable, at least for the present, for a small state like the R.O.K. in view of dollar factors, agreement among the concerned great powers would be very difficult to reach in a practical sense. To say nothing of the great powers, Premier Kim Il-sung would not recognize the possible neutrality of South Korea in the first place. Besides, it is almost impossible and impractical to be assured of solid guarantee for the security of sovereignty as there is no "absolute and secure" power of the small state's own as advocated by Machiavelli.

## ALTERNATIVE #5 : ARMAMENTS

Last but not the least, "armaments" here implicitly means the "attainment of self-defense capability" by means of some viable arms. Armaments are in fact the principal means by which a nation endeavors with the power at its disposal to maintain or re-establish the balance of power. What is needed to escape from fear of attack, a feeling of insecurity, is to make nations actually secure from attack by some new device and thus to give them a feeling of security. That new device can very well be armaments. Although small states often find it difficult to self-defend with their own national power, it occasionally is not altogether impossible for them to attain a self-defense capability to the minimum degree. The small state is advantageous over the great power in that its interests are local and limited.<sup>17</sup> Thus for the small state all attention can be focused upon a single objective allowing it to reduce armaments cost per unit of area to be defended, whereas the large state, with varied and extensive interests, must balance these and give a relatively fleeting glance towards a particular small power. Once attained, self-defense capability provides the small state with great appreciation of independence. In other words, it needs not be controlled by other states; in Machiavelli's words, it does not become allies' prisoner when victorious as self-defense capability is of the small state's own. Therefore, it is an ideal for every small state to set it as its objective to attain self-defense

capability by all means possible as long as it can stand the burden of dollar constraint.

Without doubt the U.S. Forces in Korea have been the most important deterrent on the Korean peninsula. Another important factor among many that contributed to inhibiting a communist attack on South Korea has been the belief of South Koreans that such an attack would be almost certain to fail. The belief itself was in existence thus far on the southern part of the peninsula thanks to the physical presence of the U.S. Forces there. The expectations of failure, however, must depend on North Korean perceptions that South Korea actually does possess an effective war-fighting capability. Here arises a necessity of the "absolute" strength of the South Korean Armed Forces. If in any case the deterrent becomes dangerously eroded, the national security requires acquisition of a credible independent deterrent-possibly one based on an independent nuclear retaliatory force. This does not entail a nuclear-winning capability but minimum deterrence. A credible deterrent, according to the Porcupine Theory, requires the small state to acquire (1) an offensive capability with high reliability though small in size or quantity, and (2) an effective defense capability that could absorb the enemy attack to the maximum extent.<sup>18</sup> The first is for the deterrent, and the second is intended to make the enemy give up its attack plot by increasing the enemy rate of cost in proportion to obtainable benefits as the enemy is forced to allocate large amounts of cost for attack.<sup>19</sup> During the World War II, Nazi Germany gave up the

attack plan against Switzerland because the Swiss absorbing power for the attack was estimated to be high. By the same token even a superpower, such as the Soviet Union, is reluctant to launch an all-out attack against China because of the high loss estimate.

While the porcupine's quills seem to be capable of assuring the security and maintenance of independence for the R.O.K., the question rises as to whether the propositions, especially the third one,<sup>23</sup> of the Porcupine Theory can be validated in the South Korean environment. Several factors must be considered in estimating the possibility of South Korea acquiring the porcupine's quills.

The first concern is technology. Although it is true that nuclear weapons technology requires expertise in many sophisticated fields such as design, fabrication, and field testing of fission weapons, the basic information in these area is now well known among the specialists in the field.<sup>20</sup> In South Korea, there were in 1976 about 1,000 atomic energy experts including 600 at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), which then had 250 scientists, 56 of them with a Ph.D. degree in nuclear science; it is estimated that there are now more than 3,000.<sup>21</sup> And, such is the overlap in the scientific and engineering skills required for peaceful and weapon uses of nuclear energy that the South Koreans can in fact take, as far as technological development is concerned, all the preliminary steps in a nuclear program short of

putting together the weapon itself. So there should be no difficulty with technology should South Korean leaders decide to go nuclear.

As far as fissionable materials are concerned, it is estimated that South Korea will be able to produce plutonium (Pu-239) in the amount of 4,168 to 5,049 kilograms during 1978-1987 period.<sup>24</sup> This amount is sufficient to produce over 1,000 atomic bombs. This is not simply a mathematical calculation but a reality. The first atomic power plant in South Korea started operating in 1978 with capacity of 587,000 kilowatts (kw), and there are six more units under construction. Especially, Number 3 is a Candu-type PHWR (pressurized heavy-water reactor) planned to be in operation early in 1982 from which the materials for nuclear explosion can be obtained. And Numbers 7 and 8 units will be built on non turn-key basis for a high rate of localization with capacity of 900,000 kw each; they are scheduled to be dedicated in 1986 and 1987 respectively. Furthermore, the South Korean government has decided to build a total of 12<sup>25</sup> atomic power plants by 1991. Although these plants are planned for the sole purpose of exploitation and development of energy resources to meet the difficulty envisioned for the upcoming decades, it is to be remembered that they do use resources from which fissionable materials for the atomic bomb itself can be processed. It is noted however that there exists an international diplomatic obstacle to South Korea in acquiring a reprocessing plant large enough to process this



quantity of spent fuel, although it can be managed with technological and political due considerations if the absolute necessity of going nuclear arises. Prospects of the resources are promising at least for the emergency situations as a new vein of uranium ore was found in South Korea recently making the total deposit of 43.6 million tons and the Korea Institute of Energy and Resources (KIER) is planning to conduct large-scale exploration including a radiological check by using airplanes during the Second Five Year Socio-Economic Development Plan (1982-1986).<sup>26</sup>

Another important consideration concerns delivery system. South Korea has now 60 F-4D/E fighter bombers which can carry nuclear warheads. These are the most feasible mode as their 800 nautical miles of combat radius can include all cities in North Korea, Japan, and also 17 of 21 cities in China and 2 cities with a population of over 200,000 in the Soviet Union.<sup>27</sup> In addition to the F-4D/E's Honest John and domestically produced medium-long range missiles (test-fired on 26 September 1978) are also available. Capabilities of these delivery systems will drastically improve especially in range and accuracy during the period 1982-1986 for the Second Force Improvement Plan, and some new systems might be introduced as well. Improvements in delivery system are inevitable due to the continuous technological developments in today's weapon system.

These considerations discussed thus far are all constrained by the status of the national economy since the economic cost of the development of nuclear weapons is particularly important for a small state like the R.O.K. It is estimated, however, that the cost for a small program to produce one 20 kiloton plutonium warhead per year for 10 years could be reduced to about 8 million dollars (1976 US \$) per year provided<sup>28</sup> that plutonium was obtained from a power reactor. So the cost of a nuclear program does not seem to be a major constraining factor in consideration of the projected expenditures available for the national defense of the R.O.K. As forecasted in chapter III, the R.O.K. will be able to allocate, in 1990, 4.74 billion dollars for military purpose, and the military balance of power will favor the South due to a great divergence in national powers between the two Koreas.

Whether South Korea will go nuclear or not really boils down to one factor, that is, the decision of the South Korean leaders. That decision will and should be of course derived from the absolute necessity. As discussed thus far, there seems to exist every possibility for South Korea of going nuclear once the necessity overrules the existing circumstance. However, going nuclear is not and cannot be just one of simple routine events as it encompasses lots of other constraints in a practical sense as well as many international consequences.

South Korea will be faced with possible hostile responses by the superpowers against proliferation as the R.O.K.

signed and ratified the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in 1975. Especially the pressure from the United States might well be in the form of (1) political condemnation, (2) the denial of any additional nuclear equipment including the access to the United States enriched uranium needed to keep South Korea's nuclear power industry in operation, (3) the complete withdrawal of all trained American personnel, (4) the denial of all forms of economic assistance, (5) the actual de jure termination of military alliance support, or (6) military action. China and the Soviet Union will not be pleased either with proliferation of the South Korean nuclear capacity as they share borders with North Korea, South Korea's direct opponent.

South Korea will also be condemned to take the ultimate consequences that could be profoundly destabilizing in terms of the effect on North Korean behavior and peace and stability in Korea. It is almost certain to be said that if the South does go nuclear, the North will have to go nuclear also either independently or supported by its superpower patrons, and that the North will in reality accelerate its efforts to build up its own armed forces resulting in an accelerated arms race between the two Koreas. And the necessary corollary of this arms race will be in fact a constantly increasing burden of military preparations devouring an ever greater portion of the national budget and making for ever deepening fears, suspicions, and insecurity.

Nevertheless, history proves the old Machiavellian Theory that "good arms" make "good allies." The French, at least between 1958 and 1969, had greater difficulty in seeing the relative power relationship between themselves and the U.S. as immutable. President Charles de Gaulle embarked on a nuclear policy of strengthening his country specifically to make it more independent of the U.S. France's de facto withdrawal from the NATO command structure and its veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market are evidence that de Gaulle's policy did have some success. India, another example, was vigorously against proliferation of nuclear weapons until it became the sixth nuclear power in May, 1974 after succeeding in nuclear testing in light of the ever-growing realization of the necessity of a viable and credible deterrent against the P.R.C. Once the nuclear weapon was in India's hands, serious arguments up to that point became nothing but useless and the fact was accepted worldwide. Both France and India still remain on generally good terms with the United States as well as with many other free countries in the world.

Besides, contrary to many expectations, "the spread of nuclear weapons would increase rather than decrease stable relations between superpowers and subpowers in the region," because of the stabilizing effects on such weapons.<sup>29</sup> The responsive and selective use of conventional forces, coupled with a credible capability to employ nuclear weapons, reduces the likelihood of extended conflict. While a concerned superpower

has an option to threaten to cut off support to the dependent pariahs if they consider proliferation, those dependents in many cases have no choice but to proliferate in order to protect their sovereignties, if aid is cut off, as support of their conventional forces dries up. For them there are few viable options. It is possible not only for the R.O.K. but for any nation as a sovereign state to make its own judgment on the matter of "going or not going nuclear." The distribution of atomic weapons throughout the two Koreas plus their surrounding superpowers would be effected in such a way that none could use these weapons offensively and all could use them for their own defense.<sup>30</sup> Because of the destructive nature itself atomic weapons will, in fact, contrary to many arguments, better serve the cause for the maintenance of military balance.

#### SUMMARY

The techniques available to the small states in the cold war era are in reality greatly limited. Today certain kinds of small states are among those doing the demanding instead of resisting demands from the great powers; having taken a step which might have brought a violent reaction from a great power, the small power diplomats may continue to employ such techniques as distraction, the exorbitant price for settlement, trade in insignificant concessions, and the exploiting of divisions among their opponents. Yet, it is hard to practice the art of procrastination while taking the initiative. The balancing of demands and concessions between the great powers

is still necessary today, but the dangers to the small state of exploiting its weakness seem great. The process of becoming a satellite is now well-known - a combination of economic entanglement and interference with internal affairs of the legal government. The penalty, loss of independence, is universally feared. Efforts to rally a group of small states into a military bloc are also likely to be as ineffective as earlier. They usually multiply feebleness, even if they occasionally impress a desperate great power. Furthermore, attempts at mediation through diplomacy between the great powers are equally unlikely to have effect; the "bridge" is used to tread upon.

A basic question in small power diplomacy is how a nation's sovereignty can be assured without losing independence. The only truly viable solution to this question is for the small state to acquire porcupine's quills of its own. They entail a credible deterrent composing an offensive capability with high reliability and effective defense capability that could absorb any form of enemy attack. It is the only reliable Messiah of a nation who can save it from the crisis. Although some constraints are envisioned in acquiring the porcupine's quills, it would be far better to save the home and family with whatever means available than to be destroyed and perish. After being destroyed, there may be some worldwide pity temporarily, as evidenced for the Vietnamese. But it will soon fade away from the people's memory, and the earth will continue to roll as if nothing had happened. If necessary, a nation

has a right, whether justified by others or not, to do everything in its power to defend its own security, including development of nuclear weapons.

#### CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

1. Arnette B. Fox. "Small States Diplomacy," Diplomacy in a Changing World, ed. by Stephen D. Kertesz (1959), p.339.
2. J.L. Brierly. The Law of Nations, 6th ed., p.129.
3. Marshall R. Singer. Weak States in a World of Powers, pp. 273-274. Originally contained in "A Puzzlement," by Richard Rogers and Oscar Hammerstein in The King and I, Williamson Music, Inc.
4. Machiavelli, p.161.
5. Morgenthau, p.186.
6. Singer, pp.282-283.
7. This is to be distinguished from such Collective Defense Systems as NATO or Warsaw Pact that were organized hierarchially by the great powers initiatives.
8. Morgenthau, p.411.
9. Ibid., p.408.
10. Singer, p.281.
11. Mendel, p.1056.
12. For details of "the unit veto system," see Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics, (1957), pp.50-52.
13. Fox, p.344.
14. Ibid., p.350.
15. Sang Woo Lee, p.133.
16. Fox, pp.349-350.
17. Ibid., p.340.
18. Sang Woo Lee, p.137.
19. Ibid.
20. Young-sun Ha. "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The Case of Korea," Asian Survey, XVIII (Nov.1978), 1138.



21. Ibid.
22. Clough, pp.33-34.
23. See chapter II, page 16..
24. Young-sun Ha, p.1138.
25. "Construction of Nos. 7,8 Nuke Power Plants," Korea News-review, Vol.10 No.9 (February 28, 1981), 10.
26. "Uranium Ore Deposit in Chungchong-do," Korea Newsreview, Vol.10 No.10 (March 7, 1981), 19.
27. Young-sun Ha, p.1147.
28. Ibid., p.1147.
29. Ibid., p.1150. Also see, for further details, Steven J. Rosen's "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East," Nuclear Proliferation and Near-nuclear Countries, ed. by Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, Cambridge: Ballinger Public Co., 1975.
30. For the background of this statement see Pierre Gallois' The Balance of Terror - Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961), especially chapter IV (pp.167-234).

## CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS

### SUMMARY

Three international political theories were introduced in chapter II in a hope of providing theoretical guidelines for the R.O.K. in the development of alternatives in meeting the peculiar dilemma. Convergence Theory suggests there might be a time; from a long-term standpoint, when the two Koreas are destined to move closer to each other to converge into a hybrid of the two. Ideological conflict might be in fact negotiable in the face of technological and organizational interactions. Machiavelli then is very emphatic about the necessity of "power." That power, represented by good arms, must be absolute and secure. And "good arms" must be of the prince's own for the only reliability is what is in his power. Also the significance of the porcupine's quills is addressed: the capability of delivering critical damage to the attacker as a retaliation. It seemed particularly applicable to a small state like the R.O.K. which is placed in a turmoil where hostile superpowers along with the most vicious communist North Korea are involved in. All of these theories certainly helped to formulate viable options for South Korea as opposed to North Korea supported by its superpower patrons.

In chapter III the roles of the four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula - the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C.,

Japan and the United States - were analyzed with emphasis on the geographical significance of the peninsula to them and their interests in and policies toward the peninsula. In addition the North and South Koreans were compared with respect to their military and economic capabilities and potentialities. The analysis clearly illustrated that military balance now on and around the peninsula favors the enemy. To make it worse historical evidence reveals the lessening of American influence in the region and even casts doubt as to the credibility of their future commitment, whereas North Korea is desperately making every effort to strengthen its military capability taking advantage of the competition between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. to attain paramount influence in the northern part of the peninsula. The commitments of these two communist superpowers to North Korea are as firm as ever; they will come to its aid automatically and immediately in the event of external attack. Nevertheless, all four great powers appear to favor the "status quo" for the possible scenario for the peninsula in the context of their respective interests. Once the U.S. troops are withdrawn from the peninsula, however, creating a power vacuum, it is very likely that the enemies will attempt to fill it for their own sake individually or collectively. In this case the scenario will be the "North Korean dominance of the peninsula." Despite many current disadvantages in contrast with North Korea especially in the field of military power, South Korea is foreseen that it will

achieve economic as well as military preponderance by the end of 1980's or so provided that balance of power on the peninsula is continuously maintained. The point is everything is uncertain in today's international environment and the destiny of a nation cannot be relied on this uncertainty.

Chapter IV analyzed five alternatives open to South Korea. It attempted to suggest a best course of action through analyses of advantages and disadvantages and conditions, as deemed necessary, of each alternative in light of the reality persisting on the peninsula. Theoretical guidelines derived in chapter II also were applied to test the validity of each alternative. Nothing seemed to provide such assured deterrent as "attainment of own defense capability" through some viable means such as the porcupine's nuclear quills. It is determined so based on the premise that the destiny of thirty-eight million lives can and must only be relied on something credible, something dependable that assures their security.

#### CONCLUSIONS

What would happen, if, for example, the Russians were overwatching the Americans with approximately 700,000 man armed forces only 30 to 50 miles from Washington, D.C.? It was understood that members of the National Security Council spent several nights in a row without catching sleep at all until the last moment of decision after the Soviet Union brought the missiles into Cuba in 1962. How far is Cuba from the U.S.

territory?

The R.O.K. has been indeed fortunate thus far in deterring the Second Korean War under the United States defense umbrella. The most significant deterrent has been, and still is, the presence of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Thus the untimely withdrawal of the USFK will make the R.O.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty a meaningless document and consequently result in the abrogation of the Treaty itself. It includes, needless to say, withdrawal of nuclear umbrella and loss of war-fighting capability/deterrent to a significant extent. This may further escalate to the termination of the friendship forged in bloodshed that has been maintained between the two countries during the past 30 years. It is not intended here to mean that the U.S. Forces should remain in Korea forever. They should be withdrawn eventually. The question is when. It is particularly difficult in such a rapidly changing international environment as military balance on the peninsula must be considered in terms of relativity. Thirty-eight million South Korean people had to shiver with fear of attack from the North whenever "untimely" - at least to them - withdrawal was announced contrary to their expectations. There seems to be now however some relief from this fear as the President Reagan specifically promised that American troops stationing in South Korea would remain there.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, this temporary relief does not entail any "certain guarantee" for the security of the peninsula for no one can be sure of what is going to happen

during and after the coming four years. One of the peculiar characteristics of today's international politics is that today's friend can very well become an enemy tomorrow. It is by no means a wise idea to depend for the lives of inhabitants, the destiny of a nation, regardless of their size, on such an uncertainty. There must be something assuredly dependable with sufficient degree of credibility which enables the nation to exercise independence. None is more important than the need to maintain an effective deterrent and an effective war-fighting capability.

The porcupine's quills are an answer to the dilemma, although they do not necessarily have to be nuclear weapons as long as they can assure the enemies that any possible gain they might obtain by launching an attack itself or through exercise of their power of influence will be outweighed by the damage they would have to suffer. It is therefore suggested that the R.O.K. key the direction of its self-defense to the achievement of independence in countering the surrounding superpowers as well as the communist North Korea, and for that purpose take all the preliminary steps in a nuclear weapon program short of actually assembling the weapon itself, without violating its international commitments. Nuclear balance will influence more greatly the surrounding great powers than non-nuclear balance, and it will enable the R.O.K. to secure a deterrence capability of its own. Since the military strategy of the R.O.K. is basically aimed at deterring war, nuclear balance on the

peninsula will only play a purely functional role. Furthermore, the quills will enhance the R.O.K.'s diplomatic stance in international arena. The rationale is supported even by Mr. Haig who has repeatedly expressed that "national power, especially military power, is central to the outcome of the diplomatic<sup>2</sup> deliberations."

The porcupine's nuclear quills will not do by themselves. This absolute and secure weapon must be supported by conventional measures as its use is greatly limited by its own destructive nature.

An internal effort is needed to insure sufficient self-control and strength of leadership to carry out a rational policy. It is essential for the R.O.K. that its people maintain political unity in the face of subversive efforts, loyally support the government and preserve their self-control and single-minded devotion to the state even when under terrible strain. For the time being the nation calls for unity among the people not only in purpose and action but in ideas and aspirations.

Strenuous efforts are also needed in the field of national economy in order to explore the potential of the Korean economy and the capabilities of the Korean people once again. To do it to the fullest extent it will be necessary to apply hard, positive thinking to the internal as well as external causes of economic problems and to solve them with creative and innovative programs in conformity with the goal

of democratic welfare state. This will constitute a qualitative shift in the emphasis of future economic plans thereby providing a firm backbone for the self-reliant defense posture.

Diplomatic efforts are needed in relations with North Korea, the United States and the world as a whole. North Korea must be persuaded that it has no alternative but to concede the legitimacy of the R.O.K., renounce the use of force, and accept that unification must and can be achieved only by peaceful means. With the porcupine's quills in the R.O.K.'s hands supported by the aforementioned additional measures, there might be in fact at some point some type of convergence, as the Convergence Theory states, such that the two Koreas are destined to move closer and closer together until the communist North Korea finally accepts the desirability and ultimate inevitability of an entente with South Korea and the futility of its continuous over-spending in military expenditures.

The R.O.K. also must do its best to maintain as close ties as possible with the United States so that the U.S. first moves, if necessity arises, to create the political context within which troops can be withdrawn sensibly, unprovocably, and purposefully. There must be no power vacuum on and around the peninsula. If it ever occurs, the enemies should never be given a single chance to fill it. In this regard continuous cooperation and coordination are solicited between the R.O.K. and the U.S.

Diplomacy must be extended to as many countries as possible including "non-hostile" nations



so that they understand the truth, the reality on the Korean peninsula, and stand by the South instead of the North. There are in fact some people in this world who became to believe such fabricated North Korean statements that the Korean War was initiated by the South Koreans, the underground tunnels underneath the DMZ were dug by the South Koreans, etc. etc. It is a great pity for them as well as for the South Koreans themselves. Such fabrications must not be tolerated to be spread around or to be accepted.

All these measures/efforts must be integrated into one single system gearing toward the achievement of assured, credible, and dependable deterrent.

No matter how humble it may be,  
there is no such place as home.  
That is because home means freedom,  
because home means independence,  
because home is credible,  
because home is dependable,  
and because home is where one can live, can rest, and must die.  
This home must be assured of security at whatever cost.

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